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Foundationalism is • trIditioaal meupbiIosopbica position which holds that rea.lity
can be expIamed md described absolutely. FOODdItioaaIists maintain that our questions about
<oaJily inquire beyond the copobilities of""' onImoty languqe and tIw. the<efa<e. these
questions require absolute answus that are pInxd in • metaphpic:a/ vocabulary which
reaches beyoDd ordinary IaDguase to an abtoIuIe raJity or melDplrysicaJ foundation. I
maintain that we should forget fOUllllilboDalUm because the notion of a metaphysical
foundation is a ncedless presupposition that results from Utcoberent assumptions about the
nature of language and reference.
In order to make a case against foundltionalist philosophy [ investigate its application
to traditional questions addressed by Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam in the current
realism/antirealism debate. I examine both RaTty's and Putnam's critiques of metaphysical
realism. which is a clear ClWnple ofa foundationali51 approach to questions about reality, and
I compare the kinds of nonfoundational pragmatism with which they attempt to replace it.
Although Rarty and Putnam agree that metaphysical realism is incoherent, Putnam
professes that he does not agree with Rorty's replacement - ethnocentric pragmatism.
However. my comparison ofRorty's ethnocentric pragmatism with Putnam's natural realism
reveals that, despite Putnam's criticism of RoTty's position, both positions are remarkably
similar. In his arguments against metaphysical realism Putnam clearly recognizes the
incoherence offoundationalism, but Putnam', charge of relativism against Rony contradicts
the very arguments that PutMm himsdfemploys against metaphysical realism. [ contend that
Putnam's discomfort with Ronys ethnocenlrism suggests that Putnam has not quite
su<:ceeded in forgetting foundationalism.
The postmodem recommeod.ation to forget foundationalism is not a new one;
Wittgenstein proposed it in his PhilosopIdcoJ Inw.sngations fifty years ago and Rorty and
Putnam are proposing it now. I am rCunriDg dis recommendation in order to show that the
aiticism Rorty (especially) and Putnam have received is an unwarranted and often dogmatic
rdiJsaI to accept the limits orphilosophical inquiry.
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I take it as a fact of life that there is a sense in wbicb the task of philosopby is 10 overcome
metaphysics and a sense in which its tuk is to contime metaphysical discussion. In every
philosopher there is a part that cries, "This enterprise is vain, fiivolous.. crazy-we must say
'slOp'''' and a part that cries. "this enterprise is simply reflection at the most general and most
abstract level; to put a stop to it wouJd be a crime against reason." Ofcourse philosophical
problems are unsolvable; but as Stanley Cavell once remarked., "there are better and worse
ways of thinking about them."
Hilary Putnam, Realism With a HumanF~. p. 19.
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CllAPTERI
THE DEVELOPMENT OF roUNDAnONALlST PHILOSOPHY
Metaphysics is motivated by a profouDd, pIWosophical ambition to undenta.nd and
explain reality. This ambition is similar to the expluatexy aims of scientific or humanistic
investigations into the nature oftbeunio.ux bo:::Iux like metaphysics the aim oreach of these
investigations is to provide us with a language that descnbes reality. However. what
distinguishes metaphysics from these other investigations is itsjoundafional criteria. In one
comprebensive language under which all other descriptions of reality can be subsumed,
metaphysics intends to reveal the absolille foundation upon which all other descriptions of
reality rest.
TrDtionaIiy, metaphysical investigations into reality explore me relationship between
human experience and the rest of the experienced world.. By examining the nature of
COnsci0USDCS5 and the nature of the causes of our experience of lhe world. traditional
metaphysicians hope to reveal the fuundatiooal stI'I.JCtW'eS of reality and explain what it means
to say that something is real. In our more recent past. ho~. philosophers have placed
ooosidc:rabIe emphasis on the rolc that I.anguIge plays in revealing metaphysical foundations.
As a result oflhis -linguistic tum- the foundationalist intentions of traditional metaphysics
since Plato have become suspect in our present historical context.' The controversy is
apparent in the ract that much ofthis century's philosophy has been spent either questioning
I See the introduction to Richard Rorty's, The Unguimc Tum for an explanation of why
we eventually turned to an analysis of language for answers to our philosophical questions.
the relevance offoundationalist metapbysi.cs or justifying its continued practice. However,
for those who are currently justifying metapbysics, at times it seems that their desire to
understand reality foundationally is compromisU:la the desire just to understand.
The last tweaty years ofquestioning the tndition of philosophy have panty loosened
the grip foundationalist metaphysics bas on the direction of philosophical discourse. Hilary
Putnam and Richard Rorty have led this rcceIIllttIck on our traditional assumptions, and
their new pragmatist discourse is the subject ofthis thesis. However, while both philosophers
offer challenging. nonfoundationalist suggestions for the future of philosophy, there are times
when it seems that the challenge these suggestions pose is greater than our desire to engage
them. For this reason I feel it is important that we regain our perspective and learn to accept
the reasons why fOWldationalism has been under attack for the past one hundred years. The
nonfoundationalist pragmatism with which Rorty and Putnam attempt to renew contemporary
philosophy deserves more entlaJsiastic consideration than it has recently received. Therefore,
my objective in this thesis is to help re--establish this enthusiasm towards a responsible
commitment to ensure that philosophy is pertinent to the interests of the culture in which it
is practiced.
The next section (1.1) of this chapter will provide a brief account of how
foundationalism became the dominating: theme throughout the history of philosophy. The first
halfofsection 1.2 will show how foundationalism culminated in the metaphysical realism of
Ludwig Wrttgenstein's early Tractarian philosophy. The second half of section 1.2 will show
how Wittgenstein's later position in the Philosophical IfllIestigations exposed the
presuppositions ofabsolutist metaphysics and introduced a new nonfoundationalist approach
to the philosophy oflanguage. UoderstaDding WJttgenstein's influence is imponant because
both Rorty and Putnam draw heavily from the later position in his Philosophical
Investigations, and appreciating the depth ofWrttgeDstein's later philosophy will invoke a
greater sensitivity to the new pragmatic rccommcndItions suggested by Putnam and Rorty.
Section 1.3 of this chapter will introduce the realismfantirealism debate which reflects the
deep confusion caused by foundationalist methodology. Currently, this debate and the
foundationaIist concerns that cause it are most clearly exhibited in productive exchanges
between Putnam and Rorty. These exchanges and the metaphilosophical issues surrounding
them are the focus ofthis thesis. and they will be introduced in the last section of this chapter.
I I OUR FOUNDATIONAl lSI WSTORY
The history ofphilosophy is tilled with complex systems and methods that exemplify
the labors offoundationalist answers to the great metaphysical questions. These metaphysical
systems and the methods that have grown out of foundational questions penneate just about
every philosophical epoche. Prior to the enlightenment, metaphysical systems sought to
ground their inquiries in the imm.1tab1e foundations oran absolute or mind-independent reality
on which absolute certainty was thought to be grounded Ancient philosophers debated about
the proper place of soul, fonn and matter and about the relationship between these things in
the larger context of nature. These debates usually posited some kind of fixed, absolute
reality, such as Plato's world ofFonns, and it was thought that, because this absolute reality
c:xlubited the way the world really is, in order for human beliefs to be justified or true they
must confonn or accord with this absolute rea1ity.
Medieval philosophers turned these anc:ic::ot debates into debates over the nature of
spirit, intellect, univcrsals and partiallars in aD attempt to reconcile the earlier Classical
philosophy with the CODCemS of Christian theology. Like Greek philosophy, medieval
mctapbysics grounded reality in absokttc fouadations. It posited God as the absolute creator
whose power governs reality, determines the nature ofaU things and grounds human belief.
In this general manner medieval philosophy is the Christian version ofancient foundationalist
metaphysics.
Like his medieval predecessors, Rene Descartes supported the Christian theology of
his time, but he was also keenly aware of the importance that mathematics, geometry and
science hc1d for foundationalist metaphysics. Cartesian dualism necessitated the reconciliation
of these two apparently exclusive approaches to absolute certainty and the mindlbody
problem began. This dualism inaugurated modern philosophy by translating the older, ancient
and medieval debates into the language ofa modern audience who were struggling with the
problems that Galilean science posed for Christian philosophy. The arrival of Cartesian
dualism was an important foundationalist event because it moved the unknowable,
otherworldly, absolute reality ofancicnt and medieval pbiJosopbies into the knowable, carth1y,
inhabitable world. That is, Descartes attnbuted to philosophy an ability to attain absolute
certainty from within this world (as opposed to the world offonns, heaven, etc.) because he
believed. that science could arrive at these absolutes • the existence of God and the
irmnona&ty of the soul - without rdyiDs OIl tue:h OOIlpbiIosophical criteria a.s faith or fear of
penecution.
Tberd"ore. to the mockm. inberiton ofCartesian dualism fouodationalist metaphysics
became more than jwl: a grand search for abIoUe certainty. Through the DeW scienr.i.fi<:
methods, absolute certainry became a ratioaal, attaiDabIe goal that devdoped into an
anthropoceotric obsession to beat ndW'e al her 0WIl deceptive game. This goal eventually
resulted in what we now call the Enlightenment. During this period new science Oourished
a.s it produced valued results that even the theologians of the time could not sensibly reject.
The enlightened societies tested the capacities of human understanding with new scientific
methods. while philosophers delibented over truth theories with the founciationaIist
conviction that an absolute cxpIanation of the universe was now inevitable. Foundalionalism
had secured its place in our philosophical bistoty.
Around the time of the Enligbtemne:n1 mel iD response to the modern rationalist and
empiricist tbeorics inspired by Cartesian dualism. Kanr: anempted to reverse our philosophical
focus and tum our anention to the role minds play in constitllting natIIre. Tha1 is. prior to
Kantian Idealism. most pbilosopbers investigated a ready-made. mind-indepeodmt work! for
foundations, but afterwards their~ attention turned mostJy to the human mind and
the possibility that its capacities might reveal foundational structUres and absolute certainty.
Kant's reversal of philosophical focus was very important to metaphysical projects that
attempt to explain the relationship between human thought and the world because it
tBnsformed the original strategy of investigating the absolute nature of a mind--independent
reality into an investigation into the~ features ofbuman minds that shape or constitute
reality. Both rationalists and empiricists quickly bcpn to recognize the important role our
minds or brains played in the constitution ofOUT world.
It makes sense to see Kantim Idealism. as the natural foundationalist result of an
increasingJy anthropocentric history. Scientists and philosophers were gradually recognizing
the power and control that buma:n iJncrprcwion CQI't.ed over our perception of the universe.
Considering the new significance placed on human interpretation, it is not surprising that the
last major historical tum in the world of philosophy was linguistic. Up to the tum of this
century versions ofKantian philosophy examined perception and human experience in order
to establish absolute foundations for knowledge in the mind's pervading structures., but the
linguistic turn translated these foundationalist investigations into examinations of the
structures of language and meaning.
After Frege's distinction between Beudeutung (reference) and Sinn (sense) many
foundationalist philosophers supported the idea that a proper analysis of language would
reveaJ. metaphysical foundatiom and explain the relationship between human thought and the
world. The drive for absolute certainty that motivated foundationalist philosophy therefore
turned its investigation to the area where our words 'connect' with the objects they designate
(reference). The younger Wrttgenstein, for example, and other foundationalists of this
tradition believed that by making the right connections between words and objects they would
reveal a 6naI vocabulary that desaibes the worfd absolutely. The problem ofestablishing this
connection between words and objects is DOW the 'problem of reference.' and current
foundationalist hopes ofdiscovering a final vocabulary rest on its solution.
A discussion of the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein is perhaps the most
appropriate way to introduce the problem of reference and the state of contemporary
fOWldationalist philosophy. As I've mentioned, Putnam's and Rorty's criticisms ofabsolutist
metaphysics are strongly influenced by WIttgeDstc:in', work. Consequently, the force of their
current~ solutions to the problem offoundationaIist philosophy will be more deeply
appreciated ifwe understand his critique ofthis tradition.
Wittgenstein's philosophical development: is rich, and at times the results are
conflicting. There are two distinct stages in his thinking and they manifest in two distinct
approaches to contemporary philosophy ofl.anguage: ideal and ordinary language philosophy
In my estimation this division is evidence of the gCIlCl1l1 state of philosophy today as an
uncertain discipline confused between foundaIionalist and nonfoundationalist philosophy. My
central wony is that we are failing during this period of transition between modem and
postmodem eras to make sense at: and convince ourselves at: the critical imponance of
philosophical reflection. The next section will examine the events leading up to our present
confusion so that this confusion may be more clearly understood.
I 2 WIITGENSTEIN AND THE PROBLEM OF REFERENCE
Around the time ofWittgenstein philosophers became increasingly interested in the
poSSIbility that language could reveaI the foundational relationship between humans and their
world. These philosophers of language sought to acquire certainty by establishing an
absolutely fixed connection or refcrmc:e between our words and the objects to which they
refer. Wmgenstein attempted such a project with his picture theory of meaning in the
Tractahls Logico-Philosophicus. However, in bis PJrilosophicallnvestigations Wittgenstein
later refuted the foundationalism that motivated his cuIier philosophy. An understanding of
his reasons forre:jecting the picture theoryofmeanmg is aucial to understanding the current
state ofphilosophy.
In his picture theory ofmeaning Wrttgenstein argues for a correspondence theory of
truth which balds that meaningful propositions are pictures that are direct symbolic copies of
the world. Since meaningful propositions are symbolic 'stand ins' for the world, truth about
the real structure of the world is revealed through meaningful propositions. According to
Wittgenstein, when names are contained within the context of propositions they 'reach OUI'
to simple objects. and the fonnal structure ofthcse combinations of simple objects shapes the
logical struetW"e of the atomic sentences which are concatenations of the corresponding
names. Thus there are what Wittgenstcin calls atomic facts, which are composed of
concatenations of simple objects, and these atomic facts correspond to true, meaningful
atomic sentences which in tum are composed of simple names. On this model of
representation the world has a formal structure that the logical structure oflanguage must
imitate in order 10 represent the real world accurately. Ultimately, meaningful propositions
refer by picturing real state of affairs whose fonnal structUre is shown through the logical
structure of the propositions. In this tDa:DDer, meaningfuJ propositiollS exhibit the
metaphysical structure ofthe world.
It is important to DOte thR'lbeworid' fur"WIttgeDStein is a world of'&cts': "The world
is the totality of facts. DOt ofthings. 001 1bis is a dif6c:uIt proposition, for we ordinarily speaIc
of the world as comprised of things aDd DOt offilcb. It see:nu tlw things are physical, hard
and rea.I, whereas &cu are inlaDgIb&e IiDpisDc reptCSaltations, or mere symbols., of lhat
reality. However, Wittgenstein's theory reflect!; his recognition of the problems associated
with many correspondence theories of truth. What Wittgenstcin recognized was that the
notion of an epistemological distance between words and objects. a distance that must be
bridged with reference, causes much confusion. Ultimately, Wittgenstcin argues that this
epistemological distance bas gc:nentcd many philosophical problems and fostered the need
for foundationalist philosophy to solve them.
Wtttgenstein's picture theory ofme:aning attc:rnpU to bridge the gap between language
and the world by putting language and the world in dinet logical correspond~ that is.
Wlttgenstein's pi<:tu.re tbeoJy of meanlDg asserts that there is no real gap between the logic
of our language and the logic of the world. He contends that the correspoodence between
language and the world is not across a distance in.space or time but, rather, that reference is
fixed through the structure of the world which is exactly expressed in meaningful language.
The world, says Wlttgenstein, exists as facts which show themsdves to us through meaningful
2 Wittgenstein, Tnx:latlLf Logico-Philosophicus, p. 31, proposition I. I.
propositions. However, in order for an object or thing to be 'known' to exist it must first be
capnaed within the meaningful structure ofa language. for we can only speak coherently of
what can be clearly referred to. Ultimatdy, WdtgeOStein" picture theory of meaning supports
the view that ifwe obey the universallogK: ofour gmnmar, which is identical to the logical
space that orders the world, then we wiD have true pictures of the facts which comprise the
world. Rorty's and Putnam's criticisms oftbcse 'true pictures' will be explained in chapters
two and three; however, the remainder of tlUs section will present Wittgenstein's own
criticism ofms earlier philosophy so that Putnam and Rorty will be more clearly understood
in these later chapters.
Not long aftcr Wiugenstein wrote the Tractatus he began to doubt the notion of an
ideallanguage. Initially, Wiugenstein believed that his pictUre theory of meaning explained
the absolute. mindIIanguage-indepcndcot reality that the tradition before him sought 10
explain. However, in sharing a common goal with this tradition, the early Wiugenstein also
shared its assumption that there is a reality which can be meaningfully posited and explained
as being independent of human thought. That is, Wrttgenstein assumed that an absolute
language could turn itself inside out and describe its underlying reality. This assumption is
the central target ofRorty's and Putnam's criticisms presented in the next two chapters, and
I will be refer [0 it - and others like it - as the -foundationalist assumption.-
WtUgenstein came to realize in the PhilosophicallfIWstigations that the Tractarian
model of language does not account: for the innumerabk ways in which language operates.
In the lfIWstigations Wiugenstein analyzes ordinary language and describes many ways that
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language works,. illustrating that an ideallaDguage pbiJosopby which maintains one static logic
simply misunderstands the dynamic and diverse functions of language. In reference to the
problems associated with one ideal picture of1&nguage Wittgenstein writes:
The paradox [m tbiscase the status ofrDCDtal events] disappears only if we make
a radical break with the idea that IansuI8e always functions in one way.J
The main point ofWittgenstein's critique ofw earlier- philosophy of language is not simply
that language bas more than one function; rather it is that language cannot have the one
function that the Traclotus and much of analytic philosophy presumes it to have. That is.,
according to the later Wittgenstein, the function of language cannot be to produce true
propositions whose truth lies in the acaJnIte representation ofa language-independent world.
In the Investigations, Wittgenstein shows that our words get their meanings in
innumerable ways which are not sireply determined by the fonnal universal structure of a
language-independent world Rather, the use ofour words is determined by contingent socia-
historical forces that shape the particular behaviors and conventions of various cultures or
'forms of life'. As Wittgenstein states, -the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into
prominence the f8ct thaJ. the speaJang of language is part ofan activity, or ofa fonn oflife,·~
Meaning is therefore crealed through the particular uses oflanguage within an established
public sphere, a 'language-game' that lays down the rules of linguistic convention through
J Wittgenstein, Philosophica1lrrvestigations, p. 304.
• Wittgenstein, Philosophicalltrvestigalions, p. II, paragraph 23.
11
ordinary, practical behavior. There are many 'forms of life' and therefore many language-
games and meanings.
However, iftbe reference ra.tioos between our words and objects can change from
one 1anguage-game to the next, then what becomes of the fixed reference relations and the
one, absolute reality that our philosophical tRdition aims to descnbe? The assumption that
penneates and often directs the history of pbiIosopby, that a mind-independent world is
needed to justifY a correspondence theory of truth, suggests that there is one privileged
language-game. But the grounds for determing the nature of such a privileged language
cannot be disassociated from the reason used to justify those grounds. However, the
metaphysica! assumption that there is a mind-independent world necessitates this incoherent
disassociation in the interests ofthe privilege ofabsolutism. Any notion of absolute uuth or
metaphysical reality is eKcluded from Wittgenstein's investigations through his discovery that
the logic oflanguage is as dynamic as human behavior. This rejection of absolute concepts
is the first step in the transition to a nonfoundationalist approach to philosophy. In the
remainder ofthis section I will briefly discuss what Wittgenstein means when he uses words
like 'truth' and 'reality' nonfoundationally.
The foUowing passage from the lrrvestigations may help us understand a
nonfoundationallanguage:
'But mathematical truth is independent ofwbetber lI.1man beings know it or oot1'-
Certainly, the propositions 'Human beings believe that twice two is four' and
'Twice two is four' do not mean the same. The latter is a mathematical
proposition; the other. ifit makes sense at all, may perhaps mean: human beings
have DI'ri\Ied at the mathematical proposition. The two propositions have entirely
12
diffc:rent KS£S.-But what would /his melD: 'Even though everybody believed that
twice two was five it would still be faun-For what would it be like for
everybody to believe that?-Wdl. I c:ouId imaaine. for instance, that people had
a different calculus. or a technique which we should not call 'calculating'. But
would it be wrong? Os a coronation WI'OItffl To beings different from ourselves
it might look extremely odd.)'
Despite the absence ofa substantial theory oftJuth in Wiugenstein's later work, r see this
passage as expressing a nanualistic aa::ouut oftrulh in terms ofcontingent linguistic activities
that lack: any reference to an independent CldJ'a-lioaWstic ground. That is, Wittgenst.ein asks
us 'to what do we appeal when we by to imagine truth to be different from what it is in our
language-game"? He says that we must imagine a different language-game in which different
'techniques' are used. But notice that when he puts the question of the truth of this new
language-game to his readers Wlttgenstein doesn't ask if its propositions could be false.
Rather, he chooses to use the more explicitly normative question, 'But would it be wrong'?
In other words, he is rephrasing objective epistemological questions about truth and reJativism
so they have a nonnative, ethical content, and, as a result, truth-values ojpropositions are
replaced with descriptions oj context and evaluation of at:tivities. Consequently.
Wittgenstein is not claiming that mathematical objects do not exist.; rather, he is simply
pointing out that their existence can add nothing to the meaning or the context of the
propositions in which they are described.
According 10 Wittgenstein, local, nonfoundationalist truth is a language-user's
endorsement of her language or fonn of life. This endorsement is justified through the
, Wittgenst.ein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 226.
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grammatical rules of the \anguagc-ulcr's particular Language-game. However, there are
inn.nnerable l.anguage-games and, therefore. iDoumerabIe truths. The above passage from the
l17Vf!stigations suggests that any perspective from which we use language must necessarily
be a value-laden and Ianguage-depend perspective; thus there are DO value-free, language-
independent perspectives. Because we CUUlOt, says Wrttgenstein, approach other forms of
life without the prejudice ofour own fonnoflifc. we caMot then objectively judge them to
be true or false. We can see them as different or wrong by the standards of our own
language-game, but this is all. WittgenSteiD notes this within parentheses in the above
quotation when he writes: ~Is a coronation wrong? To beings different from ourselves it
might look extremely odd. ~
Ultimately, for Wittgenstein, we cannot stand at a neutral Archimedean point and
determine which truths are absolutely true. As Wm:gensteiD states. ~What has to be accepted,
the given. is-so one could say-forms oflife. '" We can only judge other forms of life to be
better or worse according to the standards ofour own fonn oflife. Thus the foundationalist
assumption ofone, absolute description ofa common universe (Truth) and the metaphysical
project which endeavors to justify this assumption, overlook. the prejudice with which each
culture must view its world.
In spite ofWrttgenstcin's ordinary but profound recommendations in the Philosophical
Investigations, many philosophers still cootime to ask the great metaphysical questions. They
6 Wittgenstein, Philosophicalltrllestigations, p. 226.
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SliD wanr: confirmation ofan objective rcalitydm exists iodepcndeotJy ofbuman thought and
language. Despite the fact that some of the dabonte metaphysical systems that attempt to
do this are a &r ay from c:ommon scme. these COlllpJo: systems are invented in the interests
of justifYing our common beliefs aDd behaviors. At this stage in history foundationalist
answe'S are the most accepted answas to questions about the relationship between language
and the wortd, but they have bcIlXlme~ diffialft to maintain. This difficulty has led
to narrow reductionist positions like scientistic positivism and other more elaborate
metaphysics. David Lewis' system ofpossible worlds is one example of suspiciously abstract
and complex metaphysics that can sometimes serve to discredit philosophy in the eyes of
I1Onphilosopbers. But how far should we go in defense offoundatiooalist convictions? Do
they even need metaphysical defense? ADd sbouId we accept the notion that our realist
intuitions have been formed through a history of wdI intended but narrow philosophical
attitudes and that we should now take steps to explore new approaches?
1beseare some of tile questions that Iie.u the bean of the realismfantirealism debate
today, especially as it is discussed by Putnam and Rony. These questions differ from many
previous questions in the history of pbilosophy because they are not simply questioning the
details and arguments of a panicuJar side in the debate. RAther, they are metapbilosophical
because they question the debate itsdf. This particular attack on the presuppositions of
traditional philosophy has its origin in Wittgensr:ein's later critique of his ideal-language
philosophy in the TractDtus, and it has cootnbuted much to the curn:nt wave of pragmatist
criticism of the same tradition. At this point I will describe the realism/antirealism debate as
15
[ see it today. This will allow me to irdroduce the problem of realism as it is d.isa.wed in
subsequent chapters.
I J mE BEALISMlANJJREALISM DEBAIE
In its most basic form n::aIism is the fuuDdatiooa1ist position that there is an objective
reality that exists independeotIy of bumaa tbouaJbt. For those who are satisfied with their
ability to make sense ofsuch a claim. the problem ofrealism is how to demonstrate and verify
this objective reality. While lhere are varying positions which attempt to solve the problem,
I will be concerned with the most accepted version: metapllysicaJ realism. Metaphysical
ceaJism, or traces ofit, can be found in many b~clles of philosophy. Various philosopllies
of logic, epistt:moIogy, ethics and aesthetics are ooostrue:ted on the foundationalist assumption
that there is an independent, objective reality that grounds these disciplines. However, such
foundationalist assumptions., as we sbalI see. require impossible justification.
The position ram caIling mc:taphysicaJ realism contains three theses. The first is that
real objects exist; the second is that these objects exist independently ofour experience of
them; and the last is that real objects bave propc:rtic:s and functions whose structures are
fonned indepeodently of thought and language. In its epistemological guise metaphysical
realism ertaiIs that truth lies in the com:spondcnce ofconcepts or words to real objects. The
metaphysical realist, then, holds that we formulate concepts about the real world and that we
can use these concepts to make true statement! that colTCSpond to the real world. It has
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already been mentioned and will become more apparent that for my purposes Wittgenstein's
Tractatus is the paradigm piece ofmctapbysicaI realist work.
Metaphysical rea1ism is contested by IIIti-rcaIists ofmany sorts. One version ofanti·
realism is idealism. Idealists hold that IDCUpbysical realists are mistaken about reality and the
nature of truth. That is, the idealist argues that RlI1ity is not independent of OUT thinking
about it. for reality is at least partially, if DOt wboUy, constituted by the stnJeture of our
eltperienc:e, thought or language. For example, in what he considered to be a defence of
common sense, George Berkeley argues that all that exists are finite and infinite perceivers
and perceived objects. On this view physical objects only become real when they are
perceived because. according to Berkeley, to exist is to be perceived. One of his famous
arguments for this view is that It is impossible to conceive ofan unperceived object. for the
act of conceiving must involve the sensible ideas that comprise the actual object.
However, despite the obvious differences between realists and idealists. there is a
point where both intersect. That is, both realists and idealists can hold that what is real is
what is known. For eumple, some realists can claim that a physical reality does exist:
independently of thought and that it exists in exactly the way that we think it. This 'reality'
may not necessarily be all that different from the one posited by certain idealists who say that
reality is what the mind says it is. In both eases the reality descnbed is the same. but whereas
the realist's ontology is based on a reality in-itsel( the idealist's is based on reality as we think
it. On~'s tendec<':)' to side with either the metaphysical realist or the idealist ultimately
depends on what (Y.le considers to be the most significant ground for a metaphysics. A realist
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tendency uses the reality that we quescioIlas its grouud. whereas the idealist tendency uses
the human perspective from which we uk the questions.
The latest tendeDcy in the reafismlamnalism debate belongs to a rather unique group
of philosophers who reject realism on quite different grounds and whom I will label
'nonfoundationalists'. Like many reactive IDOVemenu and eras in philosophy,
nonfoundatiooalism is not defined by any escabtisbed set of theses or arguments; rather, it is
best explained as a scattered attack on various fouodatiollalist presuppositions in modem
philosophy. And one of the key forerunners of this anack on realism and metaphysics is
Wingenstein and his later work. in the Phi/o.sophicaJ Investigations. Many contemporary
postmodem critiques, especially in metaphysics and the philosophy of language, are
developments ofWittgenstein's suggestions in the Investigations.
As I mentioned earlier, Wittgenstein's approach to the problem of realism and
practically all foundationalist problem5 is quite fuodamc:ntaI.. He does not directly criticize the
various answers to these problems, but. instead, he offers a naturalistic description of
language which shows that the problems themselves are "houses of cards..1 that have no
sensible foundation in language. Similarly, contemporary postmodern critiques of
metaphysical realism. like the ones offer-ed by Putnam and Rorty, do not directly contest
realist solutions; rather. they simply dismiss, as unintelligible, the foundational questions that
the realist (and the idealist as weD) attempts to answer and therefore do not see the sense: in
J Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. p. 48. paragraph 118.
I.
contesting the realist answts". The question u [ am fonnu1ating it here (there are other ways
of formulating it) is., "what is the bUe reIatioosbip between thought or language and the
world'!' As I explained above, the metapbysicaI realist bolds that there is an objective world
that is independent ofour thinking and the ideIIist holds that there is not. Putnam, Rorty and
the postmodernists mentioned here argue that it is this question itself that is fundamentally
mistalcen.
I 4 BORTY AND PIUNAM' THE CURRENT DEBAlE
As I have mentioned, the postmodem, nonfounciationalist criticism contained in
WrttgenStein's Philosophical Investigations bas bad remarkable influences on many thinkers.
Wingenstein's work: stands as a crucial signpost in the development of our increasingly
postmodem perspective. The central focus of my thesis is the realism/antirealism debate as
it is currently taking place within the works of two philosophers who are very richly inspired
by Wittgenstein's investigations: Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam.
Rorty and Putnam are both infiuenccd by Wittgenstein's discoveries and this common
thread is the source oftheir simiJarphilosophical positions. However. Putnam claims that his
pragmatism differs from Rorty's in its form.dation oftnrth and recommendations for the future
of philosophy. The supposed difference between them goes like this: whereas Borty sees
Wittgenstein's dissolving of the language/world distinction as implying the end of the
philosophical problems that are grounded in this distinction, Putnam does not. Instead,
Putnam argues that many of the philosophical problems are still present, but that we must
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avoid using a vocabulary thai: goes beyond our ordinuy uses of words to solve them; thus for
Putnam the problems and their answers become ordinary. I argue that Putnam's formulation
ofthese philosophical problems does not COlIBict with Rany's pragmatism.
This thesis will concentrate on both Rorty's and Putnam's arguments against
~ realism and contemporary bmdItiooIIism in order to demonstrate that, whether
they know it or not, their philosophical positioDS coincide on the question of what is real.
That is, despite Putnam's claims that his natural realism and his recommendations for the
future ofphilosophy are at odds with Rorty's pragmatic recommendations, I will argue that,
while their positions take somewhat diff«enl approaches to the problem of realism, they both
say the same thing about what is real and what philosophy should do about it.
In order to analyze this debate in the depth that I consider it deserves, I have
concentrated mostly on the work ofRorty and Putnam. And because this debate has been
ongoing for several years now there is plenty of worthwhile, first·hand commentary provided
by these two philosophers. I do not claim to survey aU of the philosophical developments of
their positions in the past several years. It would require more room than I have here just to
traek: Putnam's movemem. As James Conant writes ofPutnam in the introduction to Realism
Wilh A Human Face:
Thus the membership of Putnam's constellation of heroes. not unlike his own
substantive philosophical views, tends to exist in a condition of peflletual flux; at
any given point in his career, one has only to glance at the current membership of
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this constellation to ascertain the saw=nJ. philosophical direction in which he is
(often quite rapidly) moving.'
My main focus is on three ofPutDam's latest booles: Rea/ism With a Human Face,
Renewing Philosophy, and W'0I'ds and Lift u weU as his "Dewey Lectures." From these
works I have assembled what I consider to be a pervading position supported by different
parts of each of these texts. 011 Rorty's side of the debate I have focussed mostly on
Phik>sophyand 1heMirrorOjNatrue, for his position bas DOt clwJged greatly from its first
aniculation. The few revisions that have been made since then have been due, in part. to
exchanges with Putnam and these revisions. with the exception of some changes presented
in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, are neatly packaged in an article called "Putnam and
the Relativist Menace" in the 1994 Journal ofPhilosophy.
The next chapter wiU examine RaTty's argument that contemporary philosophy is
afflicted with a useless and unnecessary foundationalism that has been inherited from the
history of philosophy and is exemplified in metaphysical realism. We will see how Rorty's
nonfoundationalism leads him to his pragmatic, naturalist answer to the question of what is
rea1, which is characterized by a strong linguistic convattionalism in which. there is no extra-
linguistic relationship between language and the world and where what is real is ethno-
dependent.
Chapter three will present Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism in order
to reveal his natural realist answer to the question of what is real. Like Rorty, Putnam is
, Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. xvn.
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uncomfortable with foundationalism, aDd his amanaI ra1ism offers a picture of reality that
doesn't seek to ground itself in pe:rmmmcy. According to Putnam, what is real is also
linguistic, where ·linguistic· means the place where both facts and values meet.
In chapter four I will argue tII81 PutDlm's and Ratty's arguments against metapltysical
realism amount to similar positions on the nature of reality and the future of philosophy.
Although Putnam's position appean to be las r.:IicaI aDd a Iittie more restrained than Rorty's,
this is simply a matter of the symp4thetic vocabulary Putnam employs. However, Putnam's
criticism of Rony as an inconsistent relativi.st suggests that Putnam does see a substantial
difference between his natural realism and Rorty's ethnocentric pragmatism. In chapter five
r will argue that this difference is actually a result of a deep discomfort with Rorty's truly
nonfoundationalist vocabulary. I show that this discomfort is a manifestation of a
philosophical tendency that many contemporary philosophers justifY through the
presupposition that our ordinary behavior needs absolute justification. My intention is to
show that this presupposition is unnecessary and, like Rony, I think we could benefit by




In Philosophy and lhe Mirror of Nabin Ricbatd Rorty argues that the central
assumption oftraditional philosophy is the notion of the mind as a mirror which pictures or
represents a mind-independent world.
The picture which holds traditional philosophy captive is that of the mind as a
great mirror. containing various representations - some accurate, some not - and
capable ofbeing studied by pure. nonempirical methods. I
According to Rorty this entire notion ofa mind represeutmg a world that is independent of
it does not make sense. He argues that philosophers have turned away from more important
social issues by narrowly thinking that necessary foundations of metaphysics and
epistemology could be found in such a model ofmind. He claims that these contemponuy
philosophical pursuits are esserdially fonned around this model of the representing mind. and
once the model is shown to be useless so will epistemology and metaphysics.
In this chapter I wiD outline Rorty's aiticism ofmetaphysical realism, which he claims
presupposes this particulac epistemological model, in order to show how Rorty thinks the
problem of realism should be addressed. Like the later Wittgcnstein, Rotty does not engage
the metaphysical realist on typical grounds,; that is. he does not directly attack the realist's
answer to the question of realism. Instead, as Wittgenstein did before him, Rart raises the
stakes by attacking the coherence and utility of the question itseI( thereby discrediting any
I Rorty, Philosophy andtM Mirror ofNature, p. 12.
of its answa'$. Simply PIt. the question ofrealism inquires into the 1WW'e of the relationship
between language or thought and the world. It asks if there is an independcnr. reality
consisting of real wgible objects that are DOt just maul or IiDgui.stic constructions.
Metapbysical realism is ODe answer to this question. and Rorty's attempts to show that the
question ofrSwn is incober"ent and~ ifsuccessful. wiU have drutic consequences for
the metapbysicaI rea1ist. It will become appare:IIt. however. that Rorty's own position with
regard to the question of realism is DOt simply oeprive criticism. Wnh his ethnocentric
pragmItism Rorty sees the world through a Darwinian lens and offers a positive, naturalistic
account of what is real, suggesting that we should be more closely attuned to the diverse,
nonfoundational functions of language when considering what 'reality' can mean.
Tbenea. section (2.1) will describe Rorty's account of the origins offoundationalism
which be says are found in an optional, optical metaphor introduced by Plato. Then section
22 and 2.3 will present Rorty's Wmgensteinian criticism ofthe result oCPlato's metaphor-
metaphysical realism • and introduce Rorty's nonfoundationalist approach to language.
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 will review ROfty's genenl criticism of the foundationalist
preoccupations of conternpcnry philosophy and piece together a positive, ethnocenuic
position out ofRorty's negative critique.
2 I FOUNPADONALISM AND JHE PERCEPII'AL METAPHOR
Rarty explains that the epistemological model ofthe mirror is rooted in the perceptual
metaphor that Plato used to explain the acquisition of knowledge. OfPlato's metaphor Rorty
writes,
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knowing a proposition to be true is to be identified with being caused to do
something by an object. The object which the proposition is about imposes the
proposition's truth.1
PIa1o's explanation therefore compares IcDowing to the causal process of perceiving in which
tbewortd 'imposes' itselfupon the waiting 1Ilind. Plato's metaphor. says Rony, produced the
ClJITent model of the mind as a mirror rdlcaing &Del representing the imposing causes, laws,
and objects of nature and, from this point ill history on, philosophy was mainly concerned
with the interaction oftwo distinct realms: the inner world ofthought and the outer world of
things. However, according to Rarty,
Plato... did not discover the distinction between two kinds ofentities, either inner
or outer. Rather,... he was the first to articulate what George Pitcher has called
the ~Platonic Principle~ - that differences in certainty must correspond to
differences in the objects known.)
Plato's perceptual metaphor, says Ratty, is an optional approach 10 knowledge, for Plato
could have chosen another. For example. he could have simply decided, as Kant later did,
that the mind is a filter through which nournenaJ matter receives fonn. Or he could have
decided that there were no such things as minds altogether.
Rorty goes on to argue that, because of Plato's choice of metaphor to explain how
knowledge works, philosophy became dominated by a strong desire for foundations. Plato's
metaphor suggested that ifknowing is analogous to perceiving, then knowledge is just as
1 Rorty, Philosophyandthe MirrOT ofNahlTe, p. 157.
) Ratty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, p. 156.
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susceptible to illusion as perception. Plato rude his cuJture aware ofthis problem by making
it evident that much ofwhat they believed was often unfounded and sometimes clearly false.
What they needed,. according to Plato, was • system ofdetermining which beliefs were true
and f8lse and which needed fiutha" iDspectioo. That is.. they needed a system which could lay
immutable univenal foundations for the advucement of knowledge. These foundations
would secure truth and allow humanity to piece toSetber the complex puzzle ofthe universe
by discerning the difference between true beliefs and taIse beliefs. Once certain beliefs about
the world were known to be true. philosophers could then speak with absolute authority on
important monU and political issues. Each ~elation of truth would dispel illusion.
appearance and falsity and bring humanity closer to the true understanding of reality. For
Plato the philosophical searcher for tnJth picks his way through the cavernous shadows of
deception in the physical world and emerges into the illuminated realm of pure, spiritual
reality or truth.
In this manner, according to Rorty, Plato's metaphor inaugurated 'philosophical
thinking' by distinguishing between appearance and reality, matter and spirit and falsity and
truth.
Plato developed the idea ofsuch an ioteUectual (metaphysical realist} by means of
distinctions between knowledge and opinion, and between appearance and
reality.·
• Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 22.
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Rorty contends that it was these distiDctioos that brougbt the Ancients to a need for certainty
and eventually necessiwed the creation ofgrand pbilosopbical systems and solutions that
would 'ground' knowledge in immutable fOUDdations. But, as Rorty has already explained.,
because Plato's metaphor- was optional, epistr::moIogy and metaphysics should not be the only
inheritors of pbilosophy. Instead, Rorty states that if
we think of'rationai certainty' u alDlttcr ofvic:tory in argument rather than of
relarion to an object known, we sbd look toward our iDteriocutors rather than to
our faculties for the explanation oftbe phenomenon.... Our certainty will be a
matter ofconversation between persons. rather than a matter of interaction with
nonhuman reality.'
Thus, for Ratty, the desire for foundations that sti1I affiicts contemporary philosophy bas been
an wrlbrtunate intuition canied throughout the history of philosophy. This intuition, he says.
has produced unnecessary metaphysical systems whieh have interrupted the pragmatic
'conversation between persons'.
Since Rorty's main contention with the whole ofphilosophy is with its insistence on
immovable foundations it only seems appropriate that I discuss his criticism of the one area
of contemporary philosophy that is mostly concerned with foundations: metaphysics. and.
more precisely. metaphysical realism. The rest oflhis chapter will review Rony's pragmatic
picture ofwhat is real through his specific critique of metaphysical realism (section 2.2) and
his general aitiqueoftbe foundarionalism in contemporary philosophy (section 2.3 and 2.4).
The metaphysical rea1ism that Rorty attacks is desaibcd in section 1.4 of my chapter one, and
'Rorty, PhiJosophyandlheMirrOl'o/Nature. p. 157.
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Rorty's criticism of it consists oCa sustaiDcd Wmgensr:einian attack on its central thesis: the
notion ofa Iaoguage-independent reality. The other two theses of metaphysical realism, the
Dotion that a language-independent reality can be described in a finaJ vocabulary and the
notion that knowledge of this reality is confirmed in a correspondence theory of truth, rest
upon the first and. thus, the impIi<:atioos: for tbese theses will be discussed throughout section
2,2, 2.3, and section 2.4 as well.
2 2 A CRITICISM OF LANGUAGE-INDEPENDENT REALITY
According to Rorty. contemporary analytic philosophy considers language to be a
medium which represents or mirrors a language-independent world, and linguistic analysis is
responsibl.efor"inspecting. repairing. and polishing the mirror.·' Metaphysical realists in the
anaJytic tradition assume that such a polishing of language will endow it with a greater
number of true sentences which provide a more accurate representation of the language-
independent world. It is this notion ofa language-independent world that Rorty rejects as an
unfortunate assumption handed down through the history of philosophy. This foundationalist
assumption is precisely the one Wittgenstein held in the TracUrtus when he argued, with IUs
picture theory of meaning, for an ideal language. In this respect the early Wittgenstein is a
paradigmatic metaphysical realist.
'Rorty, Philosophy and lhe Mirror ofNatfIl'e, p. 12.
2.
As I explained in section 1.2, WIttgemtein's Tracti:dUs Log;co-Philosophicus argues
that propositions are pictures ofthe &cts ofwbich the world is composed and, therefore. the
meaning ofa word ~is the object for which the word stands.~1 On this model oflanguage we
can best understand our relationship to the world by grasping the ideal meanings of our
words, for this would mean that we grasp the object itself. In other words, Wittgenstein and
the analytic tradition he founded - the tnIditioo tbIt Rorty is currently criticizing - believe that
absolute foundations (the logical structure of the world) can be revealed through logical
analysis oflanguage.
In the same way that RaTty's metaphor of mirroring appears to be borrowed from
Wrttgenstein's metaphor ofpicturing, RoTty's criticism of the metaphysical realism in analytic
philosophy is also well in the spirit of Wittgenstein's later criticism of the Tractarian
philosophy. According to Rorty, todays metaphysical realists fail to realize that the idea of
a language-independent reality simply has no content; therefore, constructing a metaphysics
to explain - or to even suggest the necessity of-such an absolute reality makes little sense.
For example, the absolute truth that is common to metaphysical realism is not an entirely
useful concept because it has no real content.
The trouble with Platonic notions (like truth) is not that they are ~wrong" but that
there is not a great deal to be said about them-specifically, there is no way to
"oaturalize~ them or otherwise connect them to the rest of inquiry, or culture, or
life.1
, Wittgenstein, PhHosophiW lm>estigations, p. 2, paragraph 1.
I Rotty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, p. 311.
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As Rorty explains, these empty realist ootions lad to • host of philosophical problems and
anempted solutions that are empty u weD:
Those who wish to ground solidarity in objcc:tivity - caD them "realists" - have to
construe uuth as comspondeDce to reality. So they IDJ5t construct a metaphysics
which has room for a special re!ation betM:JeD beliefs and objects which will
differentiate true from false belie&. They must: argue that there are procedures of
justification of belief which arc IJlItUra1 IDd DOt merely local. So they must
construct an epistemology wbich has room for • kind ofjustification which is not
merely social but natural.'
Similar to Wittgenstein, Rorty holds that language is a form of life. a dynamic
ethnocentric suuctlUe that adapts itself to changing socio-economic demands and cannot be
senslbly separated from the world. On this view there is no reference to a mind-independent
reality and ultimately no metaphysical or permanent structure is represented by language.
Thus.. there is no reason to 'construct an epistemology' with the desire to accurately refer to
such a metaphysical structure.
Those woo wish to reduce objectivity to solidarity. call them "pragmatists" • do
not require either a metaphysics or an epistemology. They view truth as. in
William lames' Phrase. what is good for us to believe. So they do not need an
account ofa relation between beliefs and objects called 'correspondence,' nor an
account oflaunan cognitive abilities which ensures that our species is capable of
entering into that relation. lo
Ratty therefore takes the foundationalist content out oftenns like 'reality' and 'tnIth'
in the same way the later Wittgenstein does, by undermining the ideal picture of language that
, Rorty, Objectivity. Relativism. and Truth, p. 22.
10 Rarty, Objectivity, Re/atMsm, and Truth, p. 22.
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the central thesisofmetaphysical realism presupposes. Like WIttgenstein before him, Rorty
argues that language cannot refer to extra-tiDguiItic entities and, therefore, the metaphysical
realist concept. ofa ~indepc:ndent rea&ty is not that coherent or useful. And since the
other two secondlly theses of metaphysical. realism rest on the first, they are implicated in
Rorty's criticism here as well. Comequeotly, the Dotion that there is a final vocabulary that
can dcscnbc a miod-iDdependem: reality aDd the notion that knowledge of this reality is
achieved via a correspondence theory oftruth are lacking in sense and utility also.
2.3 RQRIT'S NONFOUNPAIIONALIST LANGUAGE
In Rorty's pragmatic accunts of language, meaning or truth cannot lie fixed in a
Janguage-.independent world waiting to be diJcovc:rtd ao:l accurately represented by language;
there is no language-independent world and therefore nothing to be represented in this
system. As Rorty writes of the realist:
He [the realist} thinks that, deep down beneath all the texts, there is something
which is not just one more text but that to which various texts are trying to be
-adequate. N The pragmatist does not think that there is anything like that. He
does not even think that there is anything isolatable as Nthe purposes which we
construct vocabularies and cultures to fulfill- against which to test vocabularies
and cultures. II
The real, says Rony, cannot be a fixed, language-independent world that language
mirrors, for language does nOl mirror. Consequently, there is nothing to be said about the
world in this regard. Language, according to Rorty, cannot be foundational, in the sense of
II Rorty, Consequences ofPragmatism, p. xxxvn.
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providing us with truth as accurate descriptioDs of. language-independent world, because
the descriptions that it offers will only reflect the contingent beliefstructures of the culture
that uses it.
Foe the pngmatist... ~Irnowledge~ is, like "truth.~ simply a compliment paid to the
beliefs which we think so well justified _ for the moment, further justification
is not needed. An inquiry into the nature ofknowfcdge can. on !Us view only be
a sociobistoricaI account ofhow various people have tried to reach agreement on
what to bdieve.'~
Ultimately, on Rorty's view nothing is represented in language. A language-independent
world is not referred to by bits and pieces oflanguagc; rather, bits and pieces of language, as
Wmgcnstein points out., are parts ofwtw: makes up our world. The world just happened to
aUot these bits and pieces of itselfthe peculiar position ofbeing very complex expressions of
a culture's fonn oflife.
What then becomes oftnnh in such a view oflanguage? For Rorty, "there is nothing
to be said about either truth or rationality apart from descriptions of the familiar procedures
ofjustification which a given society. oun - uses in one or another area ofinquiry."u Rotty
contends that, as a result of the changing structures of language and convention, our use of
language and our procedures ofjustification change as wen. For Rotty, as for Wittgenstein,
truth is an entirely contingent maner and traditional attempts to establish a theory w!Uch
uncovers metaphysical truths are misguided.
11 Ratty. Objectivity, Relativism. and Truth, p. 24.
U Rorty, Objectivity. Relativism. and Truth, p. 23.
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According to Rorty, a true proposition is not one that accurately represents a
Ianguage-mdepen state ofaffilirs that c:MISeS the proposition to be true, because there are
no language-independent states ofaffairs...Ahhougb there ate causes of the acquisition of
belie&, and reasons for the retention or change ofbdicfs, there are no causes for the truth of
beliefS."I. A true proposition, then, is simply one that a particular culture's ethnos endorses
as the best way to think about the beliefeqJR:SICd m the proposition. Therefore, the word
"true" is "merely an expression of commeodation"u that we add onto our statements to
reinforce the prejudice of oW" fonn of life. By claiming that certain propositions ate trUe we
indicate to ourselves and to others a value-judgement whicb says that believing what this
proposition states at this point in time is more important (where 'important' is determined by
the same standards that formed the true proposition) than believing what other propositions
state about the same maner. In other words. truth is a redundant and circulat endorsement
of a form of life that gets expressed when we add -is true" onto the particular beliefs that
constitute a form of life.
Rotty's criticism of the metaphysical realism ofanaIytic philosophy, then, is that its
questions do not make sense because they are based on misunderstandings of the way
language opera!es, According to Rorty, the mindl\anguage-independent (metaphysical) reality
that the metaphysical realist claims exists is an unnecessary postulate of a nonsensical model
14 Rotty, Objectivity. Relativism. and Truth, p. 121.
IS Rotty, Objectivity. Relativism, and Truth, p. 23.
33
oflanguage. LaDguage. says Rorty, does DDt refer to language-independent objects; in fact.
language cannot refer in that way at all. At Rorty writes ofreference:
no matter what DOnintentiOnal reIaion is substituted for "cause" in our account
of how the things in the COnteDt rac:b up IDd determine the reference of the
rqJmlCIItations making up the sc:hc:me. OW'" theory about what the world is made
ofwill produce. trivially, a self-justifjius theory about that relation. 16
Thus, for Rorty, our tbcories about the oatu:rc ofre:ference relations will always reflect and
reinforce the interests and intentions with which we approach the problem of reference
relations.
Rorty's view ofianguage also suggests that the referring subject that the metapttysical
realist posits as the frame ofthe rnirrorofthe language-independent world is a useless notion
when one considers that nothing can be referred to which is independent of language. Since
there is nothing independent of language that a linguistic subject could mirror. why preserve
the notion ofthe epistemological subject? According to Rony. Plato's perceptual metaphor
and Descartes', 'eye ofthe mind' were based on misleading distinctions that the metaphysical
realist still holds dear. If the realist could see that these distinctions are the results of a
contingent choice of metaphor, then the split between the epistemological subject and the
metaphysica1 world couJd be closed and realist talk about subjects and objects replaced by talk
about language and culture.
But once we drop the notion of"consciousness" there is no hann in continuing to
speak ofa distinct entity caned "the self" which consists ofthe mental states of the
I' Rony, Objectivity. Re/atMsm. and Truth, p. 295.
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hwnan being: her beliefs, desires, moocls, etc. The important thing is to think of
the coIlection of those things as being the selfrabcr than as something which the
self has. The latter notion is a leftowr oftbe traditional Western temptation to
model thinIcing on vision, and to postulate an "inner eye" which inspects inner
states. lJ
As Rorty's view ofianguage suggests, DOthiDg exists independently of language. including
truth. Once this is rea1ized, the subject/object split is sealed within the confines of language,
and the realist does Dot need an epistemology or a system of representation to explain the
relationship between them. Like W"rttgenstein, Ratty simply urges us to inspect our
traditional philosophical questions for linguistic errors so that we can reveal any incoherence
that may result from an inappropriate use of1anguage and discontinue askiDg those questions
that are incoherent.
2.4 A NONFOUNPATIQNALIST NAR.R.ATIVE
Ultimately, the fundamental point underlying much of RoTty's criticism of the
metaphysical realism in analytic philosophy is that realism is motivated by an unnecessary
foundationalism that has seeped into contemporary philosophy of language from the modern
period. The linsuistic tum did not queU the Kantian need for absolute certainty, and instead
of leaving foundationalism and modem problems behind, it mistook language as the source
of this certainty. Rorty points out that the metaphysical and epistemological reactions •
realism and idealism - to the problems ofmodem philosophy have been mistakenly transferred
11 Rarty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 123.
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to contemporary philosophy of1angulp u the same problems differently stated. But for
Rorty,
"plilosophy" is not a name for a diIcipIiDe which confronts permanent issues. and
unfortunately keeps misstating them, or attacking them with clumsy dialectical
instruments. Rather, it is a cuIIural genre. a "voice in the conversation of
mankind" (to use Michael Oakesbott's phrase), which centers on one topic rather
than another at some given time DOt by dialectical oecessity but as a result of
various things happening eIsewbere in the cooversaJion... or of individual men of
genius who think of something DeW••• orperbaps of the resultant of several such
forces. Interesting philosophical change... oocun not when a new way is found
to deal with an old problem but when a new set of problems emerges and the old
ones begin to fade away. The temptation... is to think that the new problematic
is the old one rightly seen. II
Adopting this position, then, wouJd aIIowtbe coot.empOrary metaphysical realist to stand back
from the problem ofthe external world and realize that the problem is not one that is relevant
to (or it is Dot one that makes sense in) the present culture.
Rorty's pragmatic project shows that the metaphysical realism in analytic philosophy,
as a consequence ofWittgenstein's earlier metaphysical realism, is the unfortunate result of
the foundationalism that developed throughout the history ofphilosophy. He points out that
because analytic philosophy presupposes the epistemological subject, a language-independent
reality, and a system ofrepresenration which can accunteIy explain the relationship betWeen
the subject and a language.independent reality, it assumes the same unnecessary
foundationalist conception of knowledge as the rest of philosophy. Through his method of
historical narrative Rorty shows that the increasingly dogmatic need of philosophers to
II Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, p. 264.
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establish firm foundations for knowledge is keeping philosophers from addressing the
concerns of the conJenrpot"tl1Y cuJture OD whose behalf it operates.
Rorty points out that at the commcocemeat of the twentieth century the demands of
Husserl and RusseU for a 'rigorous' IOd 'sciedtific' method of pbilosophy brought the
secularization ofculture that begaD with DeIcIrtcs. Locke and Kant to a point where:
the scientists had become as remote &om most intellectuals as had the
theologians....The result was that tbe more -1Cieatific- and "rigorous" philosophy
became, the less it had to do with the rest of culture and the more absurd its
traditional pretensions seemed."
Considering that the work ofWmgenstein, and others like Heidegger and Dewey, are pivotal
rejections of the kind of foundationalism presupposed in modem philosophy, it is not
surprising that Rorty feels a strong lcinship with these philosophers. They abandon
representationalist epistemology and the Cartesian model of mind from which it began and
replace them with what RoTty calls therapeutic or edifYing philosophy. According to Rorty
they revolutionize philosophy
by introducing new maps of the terrain (viz., of the whole panorama of human
aaivities) which simply do not include those features which previously seemed to
dominate.»
Similarly, Rony's attempts to expose the presumptions ofcontemporary analytic philosophy
and, more specifically, metaphysical realism, operate within the same revOlutionary,
postmodem tradition ofWrttgenstein, Heidegga" and Dewey. Like these philosophers, Rorty
19 RaTty, Philosophy and the MirrorojNatIm, p. 5.
m Rorty, Philosophy and /he Mirror ojNatIm, p. 7.
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does oot simply ClIUtioo the metapbysic:aI realist against bel" foundationalist pROCCUpaOons
but, rather, be exposes her" usumptioas IDd, i:Ddeed, bcr entire project, as fundamentally
a>nfus<d and uItmweIy ddpoable.
ForRorty, the foundationalist.uitude ofmetapbysical realism narrows the minds of
philosophers with a tunnel. vision thai: exdudes the cסן0rfuiiy buman elements from
philosophy. Just as Feucrbach bad aiticiz:cd Hesd's idealist philosophy ofreligjon as an
abstract, spo::ulative metaphysical system that was aIicn to the material world., Ranf criticizes
the scientistic foundationalism of analytic philosophy's metaphysical systems as a useless
assumption which bas a1ienat:ec1 phiIosopby from its culture. And to make matters worse, this
foundationalism is borrowed from a bygone tndition that evoked it to deal with its own
unique problems. Acc;ording to Ranf, epistemological and metaphysical problems are no
longer problems for our preserlt a.utuR:. We have quite different probl.ems that require
different solutions. Whereas Feuerbacb's vision was a 'philosophy of the future' that did not
include the absuacted rational theok>gy of.spccu.1ative metaphysics. RaTty's is a post.
philosopbic:al culture which does not include the foundationalism that has confused modem
plWosophy. Through the~ offuundabo0a6on, ..ys Rorty, ·'Philosophy' became,
for the intellectuals., a substitute for religion.·11 He then points out that just as religion was
an optional explanatory approach to the relationship between human thought and the world,
so too is philosophy. Thus, because Rorty believes the foundationalist questions addressed
11 Rorty, Philoscphy and Jhtt Mirror ofNatun, p. 4.
3B
by analytic philosophy are Dot rdevaot to out presc:nt culture. he can, in good conscience.,
urge us to choose another option.
2 S WRITS ErnNOCENTRIC REPLACF.MENT
At this point one might be puzzled wba:I considering what Rorty means by 'reality'.
Although his pragmatism is largely a negative project meant to discredit foundationalist uses
for words like 'reality' and 'truth,' these words still exist, and they can make sense once they
are drained of their foundationalism. Rorty describes human beings in Darwinian terms and
thcr"cfore describes language as a naturalistic phenomenon, a tool that helps us cope with the
world. This approach is DonfoundatiolUli because it does not profess to express a truth that
corresponds to the way the world reaUy is. Wtcad, Rorty is offering a more coherent picture
than the onc foundationalists propose. And with this coherent picture we can
think. of beliefs as tools for bandli.ng reality, determinations of how to act in
response to certain contingencies, I'8tho" than as representations of reality. On this
view, we no longer have to worry about, e.g., the question "Does physics
correspond to the structure oftht world as it is,. or merely to the st:nLeture ofthe
world as it appears to us'r' because: 'WC cease to think ofphysics as cOITesponding
toanything.Zl
On this view, words and sentences are nothing more than 'marks and noises' that have no
privileged relationship to the world; ultimately, language is simply one part of the natural
world But then is the natural world real? For Rorty it is,. because the consensus in the fonn
22 Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 118.
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of life in whicb he has been initia1cd says it is. However, Rorty is aware that "we must, in
practice, privilege our own group, ew::n tbou&b tbere can be DO noncircular justification for
doing SO.13 (my italics) And for this rt:UOO Rorty Iabds his pragmatism 'ethnocentrism'
because he can offer 110 nonciraJlar justification for the ethtos that his natw'8lism expresses.
The usual objection at this point is that different fonns of life cannot poSSlbly
determine what is and is not real because tt.e are immnerable fonns of life, and this would
mean either that there is more than one reaIity,ortha1 there is no common reality at all, which
is absurd. However, by 'reality' Rorty means nothing more than what a culture's language
says reality is. The point we must not overlook is that what Rorty means by 'real' here is not
something metaphysical or absolute. Ifhe did mean something more absolute. something
beyond culture and language, then be would be anempting to do the same kind ofsenseless
philosophy that he charges the metaphysical realist with.
Thus, Rorty's naturalistic view ofreality is the Icind ofjustified prejudice with which
we must view other language-games or forms of life. Rorty calls this view ethnocentrism.
But by ethnocemric Rorty means what Wrttgenstein means when he states that "What has to
be accepted... is.. forms of life."N Rorty's fomt of life just happens to be one that involves
the ethnocentric acceptance of his naturalistic prejudice. But Rorty is aware that this
prejudice is necessary.
13 Rotty, Philosophy and the Mi"OT ofNature, p. 29
N Wittgenstein, PhiJosophicalll'rl!estigotions, p. 226.
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To be ctmooentric is to divide the lmoan race into the people to whom one must
justify one's beliefs aDd the otben. The fint group - ooe's elhnos - comprises
those who share enough ofone's beliefs to make fruit:fW convenation poSSIble.
In this sense., everybody is et:hDoceatric wbeD eopged in aetuaI debate, no matter
how much rea.li.st rhetoric about objectivity be produces in his study.H
2 6 CONCLUSION
Rorty's recommendations have drutic CODSeqllCDCeS not only for the metaphysical
realist, but also for the entire future of traditional philosophical inquiry. His suggestion to
leave metaphysics and epistemology behind appears to be a radical move to a new and
un±ami1iar area which makes many of us uncomfortable; and this discomfort is an indication
of just how deeply the foundationaIist attitude is woven into our philosophical approach.
Wrttgenstein's attempts to accomplish similar ends were met with some approval. but many
philosophers today are not convinced that we should give up on traditional philosophical
inquiry. Hilary Putnam is one such philosopber who is uncomfortable with Rorty's pragmatic
recommendations. but like Rorty he too is braviIy in:fIueooed by Wingenstein's Investigations.
Putnam agrees with much of Ron:y's criticism of metaphysical realism, just as he
agrees with the later Wtttgenstein's views on foundationalism. However, he considers Rorty's
suggestion that we abandon traditional philosophical inquiry to be radical, relativist and
premature. Putnam's solution to the problem ofmetaphysical realism, then. is much more
sympathetic to the history of philosophy and the tradition of philosophical problems. It
H Rorty, Objectivity. Relativism. and Truth, p. 30.
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appears as ifPutnam's recommeodation, naIUlaI realism, while written in a vocabulary that is;
quite distanced from Rorty's,. is not that distant from ROl'ty's recommendation at all. The next
chapter will reconstnlet Putnam's critique ofmetaphysical realism and present his natural
realism.
Putnam chooses to retain the: vocabuIIry oftraditiooal philosophy in what I will argue
in chapter 4 and 5 to be a comme:ndable but cordilmJg IIttanpt to salvage parts of the tradition
and, at times. an unfortunate slip back into the foundationa.list picture. That is, the
abandonment offoundationalism and incoherent philosophical inquiry is explicit in Putnam's
natUral realism, but his criticism ofRorty as a relat:ivist reveals a deep foundationalist urge.
(Rony's response to the charge of relativism will be discussed throughout chapters 3, 4 and
5.) While I do not consider Putnam's prqrnatic realism to be as clear an approach to the
problem ofrealism as Rorty's, I do consider its confusion valuable because it is an imponant
manifestation ofour frustntion with philosophical transition. Therefore it tends to show
others who are struggling to 1eave foundarionaIism behind where to step if they wish to avoid
falling back on an incoherent language.
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CllAl'UR3
PUTNAM'S PRAGMATISM AND NATURAL REALISM
Hilary Putnam has some serious recommendations for contemporary analytic:
philosophy that are very much like the chaDps Richard Rorty recommends. Putnam shares
Rorty's intolerance for dogmatism and clwges many analytic philosophers with an uncritical,
reductionist scientism. Professional philosophers. he contends, operate with the same kind
of narrow, foundationalist focus that Rorty claims has lost touch with the present culture.
Analytic philosophy, says Putnam, is -hefi..bent on eliminating the normative in favor of
something else, however problematic that something else may be.Ml Rarty calls this narrow
focus a desire for objectivity, which he says has misled philosophical inquiry with dreams of
eternal. unassailable truth. Similarly. Putnam urges todays philosophers to see through this
foundationalism and recognize that eternal truths and a mind-independent reality may be the
motives ofa previous era whose problems have become outdated. and too far removed from
current interests. On Putnam's view. -the dream ofa description of physical reality as it is
apart from observers. a desaiption which is objective in the sense ofbeing 'from no particular
point ofview'd has led to a philosophy that has -lost all interest outside of the philosophical
community.d
I Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, p. 79.
1 Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. II.
l Putnam, Realism With a Human Face. p. 51.
This chapter will show bow PutDam's CODYincing arguments against metaphysical
realism support his diagnosis of the curraJt state ofanalytic philosophy. It will also present
lIIe kind of realism that Putnam sees as the most sensble solution to the current
rea1ism18l1tiralism debate. Much like Rorty, Putnam f'Cljects any conventional or traditional
approach to this~ ruher. in the same way thIt Rorty urges us to experiment or 'play'
with oW' words and CODCCp1S in ways thai broadaJ. tbe spectrum of oW' WKlerstanding and
facilitate better social interaction, Putnam too urges us to change our traditional
understanding of concepts such as truth, objectivity and realism. Putnam, however, is not
entirely comfortable with Rorty's call to end traditional philosophical pursuits.
A.ccor<fing to Putnam, Rorty's suggestion to diIcard a history ofcredible philosophical
progress and abandon important issues of truth and realism is a reaction which ties on the
other side ofthe absolutist coin.. That is, Putnam suggests that Rotty's disappointment with
the failure of metaphysical realism bas resulted in his premature and absolute rejection of
metaphysical realism. Putnam then chuges that the metaphysical impulse motivates Rotty's
position as much as it motivates metaphysical realism. While there are many similarities
between Putnam's and Rorty's answers to metaphysical realism, the main point of difference
between them is that although both recognize the need to change our approach [0 the problem
of realism, Putnam's recommendations are much more cautious and refuse to give up on
certain parts of the tradition. Putnam's pragmatism therefore attempts a different approach
than Rorty's to the ways in which we have traditionally understood certain philosophical
concepts such as truth, objectivity and realism. Unlike Rerty, Putnam is not suggesting that
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we move without abandon onto unfamiliar ground; instead. Putnam's suggestions are
guidelines for walking on fiuni1iar ground in a way that does not reject that ground but which
avoids some of the pitfalls that previous ways ofwalking could not.
3 1 TIlE REALISM ATTACKED
Since Putnam diagnoses contemporary philosophy with the same incoherent
foundationalism I discussed in sectiOM Lt, 1.2 and 2.1, it is not surprising that his most
sustained criticism ofthe analytic tradition is aimed at metaphysical realism I have explained
and discussed metaphysical realism throughout the previous two chapters (sections l.3 and
2.2), but here is Putnam's formulation ofrus foundationalist wget:
On this perspective, [I] the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-
independent objects. [2] There is exactly one true and complete description of
'the way the world is'. [3] Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation
between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of things. I
According to Putnam, each ofthe metaphysical realist's theses involves what he calls
an impoSSIble "God's-eye view" ofthe world. l Putnam calls this view, which requires that the
world be seen independently of our perception, an "epistemic ideal ofachieving a view from
an 'Archimedian point' - a point from which we can survey observers as if they were not
ourselves, survey them as ifwe were, so to speak, outside our own skins."J For Putnam the
4 Putnam. Realism, Truth, and History, p. 49.
, For a detailed discussion of the notion ofa God's-eye View see part 1 ofPutnam's
"Realism With a Human Face" in Realism With a Humon Face, pp. 2-18 where he
discusses the God's-eye View assumed in Einstein's approach to quantum mechanics.
'Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. 17.
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metaphysical realist's attempts to find ODe true description of the world are incoherent
attempts to describe the world in the absolute language of God. These attempts are
incobereot., says Putnam. because the point ofview from which metaphysical realists claim
the descriptions must come is unattaiJlabIe; we cumot step 'outside OUT own skins' in
metaphysical spec:ulation However. Putnam', rejection oftbe God's-eye view requirement of
metaphysical realism is best captured in his criticism of the first thesis which explicitly
postulates a 'fixed totality of mind-independent objects.' Putnam makes its fallacy quite
apparent by arguing that we cannot perceive or describe anything independently of our
perception or perspective? He explains that each metaphysical inquiry must begin with some
kind ofsocio-historical perspective or vantage point that permits the objects of the world to
have meaning.
Putnam's point against the first thesis of metaphysical realism, then, is that the notion
ofmind-independent objects does not make sense. Our minds are inherently involved in the
conlent of our perceptions and the meanings associated with our language; our view ofthe
objects of the world must entail our current interests and other normative elements.
Consequently, a description of the world as it is in itself, independent of perspective, just
doesn't make sense. As Putnam sometimes puts it, metaphysical realism requires a ~View
from Nowhere. ~ ~a view which is the dream ofa description of physical reality as it is apart
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from observers. a desaiption which is objective in die sense ofbeing 'from no particular point
ofview.'~1
In response to Putnam's criticism. bowever, the metaphysical realist can make an
epistemologjcal coooessioa without afrectiDg the idea thlIf: a laDsuage-independent reality does
exist; that is. she can reply that we may DOt be able to know the world in itself, but that
doesn't refute its existence. This objection misses the point of Putnam's criticism. Putnam
argues that indeed knowledge of a language-independent reality is impossible. But.
additionally, the concept ofa language·independent reality itselfis senseless and. therefore,
9Jch a reality is neither a possibility nor an impossibility because the concept has no content.
The only recourse Icft to the metaphysK:al. realist is to argue that. perhaps., if God exi~s, then
a language-independent reality makes sense because God is surely not bound by the limits of
language. However, when the metaphysical realist makes reference to God she is making a
nonsensical attempt to force language outside itse1finto a language-independent world. [f
language must refer 10 God, then God must lie within its bounds.
Metaphysical realists to this day continue to argue about whether points (space-
time points, nowadays. rather than points in the plane or in three-dimensional
space) are individuals or properties. particulars or mere limits, and so forth. My
view is that God~ ifhe consented to answer the question ~Do points really
exist or are they mere limits?~ would say ~I doa't know~; not because His
omniscience is limited. but because there is a limit to how far questions make
sense.
'
1 Putnam, Rea/ism With a HU11lQn Face, p. 11.
I Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. 97.
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And, according to Putnam, metaphysical questions exceed this limit.
Putnam addresses the second thesis ofmetaphysical realism. which claims that there
is only 'one true and complete description' of the world, by arguing that such an absolute
description is impossible. Any description ofthe world must come from within a particular
theory, and not just any theory, but a human one that involves human interests. Putnam
argues that the metaphysical realist's objection that truth ties outside language and can
transcend contingent theories to get at the absolute picture is senseless. This objection itself
is made from within a particular theory, yet it nonsensically attempts to refer to a realm which
is outside language. According to Putnam, then, the realist question, which inquires into the
absolute nature ofthe objects that comprise the world is misguided, for we can only operate
from within the internal confines ofsome structured theoretical approach which cannot refer
outside itself to provide an absolute picture. Without some normative linguistic structure
(theory) consisting ofgrammatica.l rules which are themselves a part of the world of objects
under description, we cannot even attempt to descnbe these objects. In other words, our
descriptions cannot come from nowhere, and the somewhere that they come from must
include normative judgements and other human interests:
Although our sentences do Mcorrespood to realityM in the sense of describing it,
they ue not simply copies ofreality. To revert for a second to Bernard Williams'
book, the idea that some descriptions are Mdescriptions of reality as it is
independent ofperspectiveM is a chimera. Our language cannot be divided up into
two pans, a part that describes the world ~as it is anyway~ and a part that
describes OUT conceptual contribution. This does not mean that reality is hidden
4.
or ooumc:nal; it simply means tbI1 you cm't descnbe the world without describing
it!
Putnam points out that since our delcriptions of the objects of the world must come
from somewhere, the metaphysical rea1ist's claim that there is one true description of the
world involves the assumption that the world bas some kind of semantic preference for a
partio.LJar description. The physicist, for example. who professes that only physics correctly
desaibes the true state of the universe assumes that the language of physics is the language
in which the universe is written. Putnam exposes these kinds ofassumptions:
What is wrong is that Nature, or 'physical reality' in the post-Newtonian
understanding of the physical, has no semantic preferences. The idea that some
physical parameter or some relation definable in terms of the fundamental
parameters of physics, simply cries out for the role of mapping OUT signs onto
things has no content at aU. 10
Putnam reminds the metaphysical realist, who claims that this idea does have content, that she
is again attempting to force language outside itself to achieve a view from nowhere.
Therefore. the second thesis of metaphysical realism. like the first, makes a claim that lacks
any sense, for the metaphysical realist cannot single out one true description of the world
when she must operate within the bounds ofher language.
The third thesis ofmetaphysical realism is perhaps the most interesting of the lot, for
not only does it posit a mind-independent world ofobjects, but it also makes the even more
'Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, p, 122.
10 Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. 83.
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controversial cWm that truth consists oftbe correspondence of OUT language with this rnind~
independent world. Putnam fully rejects the notiOD of truth as correspondence. His basic
argument is that this thesis assumes the impossible God's-eye view because not even God
could confirm the direct kind ofcorrespondence between our miDd-dependent words and the
world's mind~independent objects. This problem is sometimes called the problem of
reference. and it is one that the meu.pbysica.l realist feels very acutely, for how can she
identifY the true relationship between words and objects?
The physicalist. response to this question is to use causation to fix reference; that is to
say that the world has a unique causal structW'e which fixes the correspondence relationship
between certain words and certain objects. But Putnam quickly shows that the causal theo~
of reference only rewords reference questions in the form ofcausation questions.
My present use of the word. ~cat" has a great many causes, not just one. The use
of the word "cat~ is causally connected to eats, but it is also causally connected
to the behavior of Anglo-Saxon tnbes, for example. Just mentioning "causal
connection" does not explain how one thing can be a representation ofanother
thing. 11
For example, David Lewis'. natural~propeny theory ofreference, which attempts to explain
the correspondence between language and the world, involves what Putnam calls 'spooley'
notions. "Rather than solving the problem ofreference, what the ideas of a constraint built
into nature and of 'elite classes' does is to confuse the materialist picture by throwing in
II Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, p. 23.
50
something'spooky,,·12 Lewis talks of'oatunl c:oostraints', which are nature's determiners of
reference that are imposed upon our 1ul8uageby the 'intrirlsic distinction' of'elite classes' of
objects that are 'out there.'l) Putnam claims that these concepts are quite mysterious and
while they attempt: to explain rcfermc:e they tum ausation into a vague and unhelpful answer
to the problem.
What lies behind Putnam's criticiIm ofthe third thesis ofmetaphysical realism is his
refusal to accept the f.actIvaIue distinction. Physicalist explanations of reference and
correspondence truth, such as those held by Lewis in his Counlerfactuals, hold strongly to
a distinction between objective &cts and subjective values. These explanations fail, according
to Putnam, because they do not allow reference-relations or any relation that attempts to
explain the metaphysical realist version oftnrth in a way that includes normative elements".
The metaphysical realist's ootion of truth as correspondence requires that reference between
language and the world be absolutdy fixed; therefOre psychological and nonnative factors are
excluded from the metaphysical realist's version of truth because they taint truth with the
indetenninancies of human behaviour. But Putnam argues that we cannot exclude the
nonnative from reference relations and truth because there is a bit offad and a bit of value
L2 Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. 38.
Il For Lewis' discussion oftbese 'spooky' notions see his ·Putnam's Paradox, ~
Australasian Joumal ojPhilosophy, 62 (1984), 221-236.
,t For Putnam's disalssions ofLewis' way with reference see p. 38 ofRealism With a
Human Face and pp.72-13 and 358-360 of Words and lije.
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in all our truths. The factlvaJue distiDction, be contends. is UDtenable1'. We will see his
argumenrsfortbeseclaims in the foIIowiDgll!:ClioD. as I disaJss Putnam's own version oftruth
which includes the nonnative and does not rely OD any kind of fixed correspondence.
3 2 PlITNAMS NATIlRAL REALISM
Putnam's opposition to mctapbyIicaI raIism CID be summarized in these three main
objections: a) we cannot have a mind-independent perspective of1he world. simply because
such a view from nowhere doesn't make sense; b) since we must view the world from
somewhere, to claim that only one particular vW:w is the right one is to assume without any
basis that the world has a semantic preference for that particular view; and c) not even God
could confirm the mysterious kind ofabsohrte reference (the kind that eltcludes psychological
or nonnative factors) that the correspondence theory of truth requires.
It should be clear by now that Putnam's main concern is with metaphysical realism's
presumption that. it can provide the one true description of the world. That is, his arguments
are directed at the absolute metaphysical requirements in metaphysical realism and not at
realism itself. As I will explain in what follows, Putnam believes that realism can be
supported without refeT'CllCe to absolutes; the result is realism without metaphysics. I will
show how Putnam explains that todays fashionable relativist reaction to the failure of
metaphysics is also an absolute position that is equally as misguided as metaphysics itself [t
I' The essays in part two of Putnam's Realism Witha Human Face, pp. 135-213
demonstrate the problems with the factIvalue distinction.
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is this insight that gives his natural realism its importance IS well as its elusive nature. Putnam
argues that relativism is an absurd answer to metaphysical questions. He demonstrates that
if the questions of metaphysics are meaningless. then bow can relativism be a meaningful
answer? That is. in the same way IS maapbysical realism, relativism. as the antithesis of
metaphysical realism, attempts to answc:r mc:auiogIess questions.
But if we agree that it is IITfintelJigible to say, "We sometimes succeed in
comparing our IaDguage and thougtI" with reality as it is in itseJ(" then we should
realize that it is also unintelligible to say. -It is impossible to stand outside and
compare ouc thought and language with the world.• "
Putnam's argument for this claim places the relativist in a very awkward position.
Putnam argues that to move from the philosophical position that the questions of
metaphysics are misguided philosophical endeavors to the practical position that we must
abandon these projects is to remain in the grip of metaphysical absolutism. For example, a
frustrated metaphysical realist who concludes that our language cannot represent anything
because there is no absolute way of knowing what our language represents is merely
transferring his desire to know absolutely into skepticism, another form of absolutism. As
Putnam writes ofRorty's current position:
But why is Rorty so bothered by the lack ofa guoranlee that our words represent
things outside themselves? Evidently, Rorty's craving for such a guarantee is so
strong that, finding the guarantee to be "impossible,· he feels forced to conclude
that our words do not represent anything. It is at this point in Rorty's position
that one detects the trace of a disappointed metaphysical realist irnpulse. 17
l' Putnam, Wordsand Life, p. 299.
17 Putnam, Wordsandlife, p. 299.
53
1 disagree with Putnam's evaluation ofRorty's ethnocentric pragmatism, but the underlying
argument in this bit of psychology is tbat, in cWming that the guarantee is impossible. the
rdalivisI (m this case Rorty) is actually answering the question that he claims is unintelligible.
If the relativist claims that the question, "Docs language represent anything outside itself?"
is unintelligible. then why would he bother answering. "No, that's impossible!" Such an
answer partakes of the same senselesmess tMt the relativist (the 'disappointed metaphysical
realist') attnbutes to metaphysical realism.·'
According to Putnam, then, the relativist solution is not only unintelli81Dle, but it is
also another manifestation ofabsolutism.
The attempt to say that WllJ'nDt (and truth) is just a matter of communaJ
agreement is, then, simultaneously a misdescription of the notions we actually
have and a self-refuting attempt to both have and deny an "absolute perspective.'
Are we then forced to become "metaphysical realists" • at the end ofthe day, if
not at the beginning? [s there no middle way?I'
As elusive as Putnam's recommendations are. he does not leave this question rhetorical. He
offers his natural realism as the 'middle way' between the two absolute poles of metaphysics
and relativism.
•• Putnam's argument against relativism is simple and successful; however, in section
4.341 will show that his characterization ofRony as a relativist is mistaken. Also, in
section 5.221 will argue that this mistake is an inappropriate slip back into the
foundationalist attitude.
I' Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. 26.
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Putnam writes that ~wbat we have ieImed since Newton is that metaphysics is not a
possible sut;ect. ~1lI Accon:fing to Putnam. tbal. tbc questions ofmetaphysical realism exceed
the bounds ofour language and uaderstaDdiDg by inquiring into the nature ofentities that
exist outside ofour language. Such mebpbyIicaI iDquiries, says Putnam, are driven by a
desire to know absolutely. And, convendy, the re!ativist: reaction is also motivated by such
absolute requirements. The desire to mow is one that Putnam respects, but it is the desire
for absolute knowledge that he cannot accept, for it places impossible requirements, such as
the God's-Eye View or the View from Nowhere, on epistemology. On Putnam's account,
this metaphysical absolutism with regard to truth and Irnowiedge fails to acknowledge the
nonnative elements that are interwoven into the objects of human knowledge through the
procedure ofknowing. As we will see, Putnam's own position, natural realism, takes a more
hwOOIe, Iwman approach to truth and objeaivit:y and presents a realism lhat avoids the hubris
of the metaphysical brand by avoiding metaphysics in both its absolutist and relativist forms.
The result is realism with a human face.
In his Words and Life Putnam makes an important point that captures his central
contentions with the metaphysical rcaIist and leads into the heart of his own position on truth,
objectivity and the realism/antirealism debate. He states:
1lI Putnam, Realism With a Human Face. p. 39.
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Given a definite language in place aDd. dcfiDite scheme of~objects.~ the reJation
between ~words and objects~ is not at an indescribable; but it does not have a
single metaphysically privileged deaaiption any more than the objects do.n
This point seems [0 amalgamate the first two objections summarized above by including the
notion that we cannot have a View from Nowbere, for we must proceed with a 'definite
language in place,' and the notion that we camot assume that the language we proceed with
is the meta:pbysicaUy privileged, semaric preference of the world because the 'relation
between words and objects' is not absolute. Th.is point, however, is not merely destructive
criticism for the metaphysical realist, for it does make a constructive claim.
That is. here Putnam expresses his realist spirit in claiming that within fixed
parameters we can describe the relationship between thought or language and the objects
within those parameters. However, before I discuss Putnam's natural realism I should preface
it by again saying that this realism does not satisfy the strong desire for objectivity and
absolute truth that's contained in lhe metaphysical realist's correspondence theory of truth., for
it rejects any notion of correspondence between language and mind-independent objects.
Putnam does not dismiss objectivity and truth from his realism. Rather, what his natural
realism does is take the strong metaphysical requirements out of realism by avoiding the
foUowing: any reference to 'fixed totalities of language-independent objects'; any norion of
'one true and complete description' ofthis totality, and. the idea of,correspondence' between
11 Putnam, WordsandLife, p. 309.
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language and a 1anguage-independent world', Thus, naturaI realism is realism without
metaphysics or realism without the
appeal to somethiDg that undulia our ..... sames: a mysterious property
that stands behind ~ both in the ImIe oCNIIlIIiaiDs ittvisibJy in the background and
in the sense ofguaranteeing - our ordiDmy ways ofspeaking and acting.n
[ think the best way to undcrstmd Putoam's ralism and his notions of truth and
objectivity is through his disawion of 'coocc:ptual reWivity', This 'pervasive phenomenon'.
as Putnam calls it. is extremely important to his project and in the preface to Realism With
a Human Face Putnam remarks that Since &ason. Truth, and History he has shifted "from
emphasizing model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism to emphasizing
conceptual reIativity.•n His latest works, Renewing Philosophy and Words and Life continue
to empha!ize the importanCe ofconceptual rd8rMty. For Putnam conceptual relativity means
that.
the number and kind ofobjects and their properties can vary from one correct
description ofa situation to another correct description ofthe same situation. lot
An example of conceptual relativity could go as foUows: there are people who believe that
their explanation of a thunderstonn as the act ofan angered God is a correct description of
a particular event. There are also people who believe that the correct explanation of a
n Putnam, ·Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An lnquiry Into the Powers of the
HumanMind," The JoumaJofPhi/osopIry, 91 (1994), p. 500.
2l Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. X
lot Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, p. 122.
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tbl.mdemorm is a scientific or meteoroio&icaJ. ODe. But which explanation is truly correct in
lhe metaphysical sense? Well, for Putnam, this questioo. doesn't make sense. The scientific
explanation may be an improvement on the previous explanation, and it may provide us with
better methods ofpredictirlgthe weather. This would mean that we could be more prepared
for tl:undcntorms, and, in a pragmatic saue. the scientific explanation is a better one for us.
But it is not the correct explanation. However. the point here is that once we take away the
metaphysical question of absolute correctness., then different explanations ofthe same event
can both be correct. Ultimately, the principle ofconceptual relativity means that Mobjects are
tbeory-dependent in the sense that theories with incompanble ontologies can both be right. "lj
Putnam's own example in Renewing Philosophy might give us more insight into the
notion of conceptual relativity. He states:
Points in space (or nowadays one often refers instead to points in spare-time) can be
regarded as concrc:te particulars ofwmcb space consists (the ultimate parts of space) or,
altemativeIy, as Mmere limits.. Geometrical discourse can be adequately fonnalized from
either point ofview; so can all ofpbysics. And whether formalized or left unfonnalized,
both ways of speaking will do peJfect1y well for all the purposes of geometry and
physics.2lI
Here Putnam puts his conceptual relativity to worle; he says that these two schemes.. or
different ways ofspeaking, can provide different descriptions ofthe same state of affairs. He
also says that although the same state of affairs can be differently described by these two
different schemes, in this case it nonetheless Mmakes no difference to our predictions or
lj Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. 40.
III Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, p. 115.
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actions which of the two schemes we USC."Z7 If it did make a difference, then we would
choose the scheme that better twfiDcd our iDtereIts.
Now, when Putnam expIaiDs that two dift'c:rmt language-schemes can describe the
same state ofafWrs one might ask just wba1 PutDam means by the 'same state ofaffairs.' It
seems that Putnam bimselfis adoptiDg the VIeW from Nowhere by referring to some kind of
transcending, 1anguage-independc:Dt I'eI1m. However, such a charge forgets the fact that
Putnam is not doing traditional metaphysics here. When Putnam speaks oCme same state of
affairs he does so from a particular language-game and does not mean anything more than
that language-game pennits.
In saying that they [different language schemes] are used to describe the same
states ofaffilirs, I am not introducing a transcendent ontology of states ofaffairs.
By a "state of affairs" I mean something like a partiele's being at a point, or a
place X's being between a place Yanda place Z; in short, I assume a familiar
language to be already in place. I am DOt saying that Noumenal Reality consists
of states of affairs.... In short, what I meant by a "state of affairs" ,,_ is just what
anyone would mean by that pbrue who was noI giving a metaphysical emphasis.ZI
Thus Putnam is not adopting a VIeW from Nowhere; I'Bther, he is making a simple claim from
within a partio.J1ar language scheme which does not refer to any 'states ofaffairs' outside that
scheme.
Putnam remarks that to ask metaphysical questions such as. "Do these two different
sentences describing the same event have the same meaning?" is to "try to force the ordinary-
27 Putnam. Renewing Philosophy, p. 117.
~ Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, p. 117.
59
language notion of meaning to do a job for which it was never designed. ~~ That is, when
dealing with different linguistic schemes it makes no sense to cross linguistic borders and
speakofsame or different meartings, fur thai: would require the senseless task of leaving both
schemes behind and finding a lingui5ticaDy DCUtraJ ground. As Putnam repeatedly stresses.,
our desaiptions oftheworkl mustcxme fiuD IJOIDC poi:rd: ofview; what must be kept in mind
is that conceptual reJativity cannot m.ke __ of metaphysical talk. We may speak of
different schemes having different uses for their words. but "whether such a change of use is
or is not a change of'meaning' is not a question that need have an answer. ~JO
Conceptual reIalivity, then, entails an ordinoryconception of what is real. The state
of affairs that is described by two different schemes is a real state of affairs, and the two
different schemes are both lcgitimaIe waysofusing words to describe that real state of affairs.
But we cannot sensibly ask which of these descriptions are truly accurate; that is, it is
incoherent to ask whether one or the other is metaphysically COlTect in its description. But
what can the real state of affairs that both descriptions describe possibly be? [fwe can only
refer to it with a language-game already in place. then does it even have a reality outside of
language? Putnam has an answer.
11Jere are many ways ofdc:scribing tbingt. some better and some worse and some
equally good but simply different, but none which is Nature's own way.... (Two
different] descriptions descn"be what is before me; neither describes it "in itself.~
JO Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, p. 118.
31 Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, p. 120.
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not because thtt "in it2!r is an~ limit. but because the "in itself'
doesn't make sense. (my italiclt1
According to Putnam, because tblft QD be two legitimate ways of describing the
same reality does not make it reuooIbIc: to conclude that either there are two different
realities, or there is no reality. Tbere is a raIity and it can have various descriptions that
come from different uses of1angulae. Ifooeub usta descnbe that reality in a way that
does not make reference to either scheme ofute. thea ooe is doing incoherent metaphysics.
But why should one suppose that reality can be descnbed independent of our
descriptions? And why should the filet that reality cannot be described
independent of our descriptions lead us to suppose that there are only the
descriptions? After all, according to our descriptions themselves. the wold
-quark- is one thing and a quark is quite a different thing.n
With this remark Putnam is emphasizing the notion that because the in itself is not a sensible
fieJd ofinquiry, this does not mean that our ordinary notions oftruth and reality are senseless
too. After all. there is a difference between words and objects; aetuaI chairs are not the same
things as the words we use to desaibe them. According to Putnam then. our descriptions are
about something. but the something that they are about is not independent of our descriptions
because we can't make sense of that something aput from the standpoint from which we
make the descriptions.
This complicated notion ofconceptual rdativity has the ability to make Putnam sound
as ifhe holds either a very weak and culturally relative notion of truth, or no notion of truth
32 Putnam, Words and Life, p. 302.
1] Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, p. 122.
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at all. As &r as the most foundatioaaJ. DCJCX:m oftrutb - mcupbysicaJ Truth - is concerned.
Putnam rejects it, but be does claim tim Iruth is DOC merely 'OJ.Itur:I1J.y determined'. -Of
cxurse. our concepts are cuJtw-aDy ra.Dve; but it does DOC follow that the truth or falsity of
what we say using those coocepts is simpiy 'deIermiDecf by the 0J.Iture.']) According 10
something outside our!aagJ..lage aDd dJousk pa.ys a rme in determining truth; however, what
we must do is recognize that bow truth is determined depends upon the nalUre of the
conceptuaJ scheme.
Accepting the ubiquity of conceptual relativity does not require us 10 deny that truth
genuinely depends on the behavior oftbings distant: from the speaker, but the nature of
the dependence changes as the Irinds oflaPguage games we invent change.:M
As he repeat:edIy stresses, the worid and bumut convention are inherently integmed,
and each cooceptual scheme wiD have dif&:rent converrtions which cast different tights on the
world. The result is oot • denial of the fact thai: language sometimes makes contact with the
world, but a denial ofthe lict that tbc:re is ODe CXXIlKt that is the correct contact. That is, the
result is DOt. denial. of truth. but. denial ofabsolute truth. The key to appreciating IfUs
insight of Putnam's natural rea1i3m -is seeing the M~tfkssnu.s and the unintelligibility of.
pictw"e that imposes an interface between oundves and the world.d} The idea that there is
:M Putnam, Realism With a Human Faa, p. 98.
Jl Putnam, Words and life, p. 309.
)6 Putnam, ~Sense, Nonsense and the Senses: An Inquiry Into the Powers oflhe Human
Mind,- T1teJoumaJofPhilosoplry. 91 (1994), p. 481.
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no philosophical interfAce between our 1u:I8uI8e and the objects our language describes is
essential to understanding conceptual relativity and the notion that truth is neither- absolute
nor relative. For Putnam, although truth is affected by conceptual relativity, there is still a
need for a picture of truth that doesn't demote truth to a property of sentences. Language
does make contact with the world through the belief! contained within our sentences, and,
he contends. we are philosophically motiv8tcd to descnbe the nature of this contact.
Putnam believes that accepting the notion that language can make contact with the
world is essential because he claims it exonerates him from the relativism with which he
charges Rotty. Because Rotty believes that truth is an empty concept and not something
which we can have a sensible theory about, he is often criticized for holding an inconsistent,
relativistic version of truth; however-, Putnam does not coosider truth to be an empty
concept.36 For Putnam,
meaningfulncss in a public language is indeed a culturally relative property; but
wammted assertIbiIity cannot be identified with a culturally relative property any
more than truth can be. I do not believe that very many philosophers would
regard the problem of truth as solved if they had to agree that the solution
involves the notion that rightness (m any objective sense) is a culturally relative
property.l1
Whereas Ratty dismisses the problem of truth as hopelessly and senselessly foundationalist,
Putnam feels that there is something more serious and positive to be said about truth.
11 A discussion of Putnam's relativist chuge against Ratty receives more detailed
attention throughout my chapter- 4.
lfPutnam, WordsandLife, p. 324.
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lam saying that OW" -realism- (DOte the small -~) Ibout the past, our bdiefthat
truthmd &Isity-rachaD thewayto-tbepat. alXI-do ootstop sbort.- ispalt of
a picture, and Ow picbtn is £Dmliallo 0lIl' /ivu.1C
Putnam's refermce to an usrt1f/iol~ ill wbich a positive ootioo of truth is contained
indicates ODe difference between his ... Rarty'a w:rsioas ofpraam.arism.. But I will address
this difference and otbc:r supposl!d di&rax:a bdM:a Putnam and Rorty in the next chapter.
For DOW it will suffice to say that Pub:ImJ. CXJIIIiders his aotion of conceptual relativity 10
avoid. relativism as weD as absokJtism, and be first uied to accomplish this task with his theory
oftruth as -idealized rational acceptability- inR~ Truth and History.
Idealiza:f rational aoceptability is the tbeoryoftruth that accompanies Putnam's earlier
-internal realist- position espoused in Reason. Truth and History and Rea/ism With a Human
Face. But Putnam has since dropped -ioternal- IS a misleading description ofhis realism"
and now prefers to describe it as -DltURJ. - This change oflabel does not significantly alter
the body of Putnam's realism; inste.d. the dwJse is merely a resuJt ofdifficuIties with the
notion of truth as idealized rational aoceptability. Putnam initially believed that this earlier
theory of truth avoided both relativism and absolutism; however, in his later publication,
Wowkandli.fe, he -no lODger defend[s] that theory ofllUth at all,- presumably because it
til too comfortably into Rorty's 'culturally relative' pragmatism. Ho~, Putnam's
JlO Putnam, Words and life, p. 217.
to See the preface to Putnam's Realism With a Human Face for Putnam's discomfort
with misinterpretations ofintemal realism and truth as idealized rational acceptability.
6. Putnam, Wards and life, p. v.
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philosophical reasons for moving away from this earlier characterization of truth are due to
the fact that certain propositions can cooc:eivabIy be true while lacking imaginable ideal
epistemic conditions. Assume. for eump&c. that it is true that mathematical objects do not
exist VerifYing this proposition would require. set ofideal epistemic conditions that extends
beyond ourcurrenr: capacity to vaifY. lu.rauIt, only the impossible God's-eye view, which
incoberently pwports to contain aU imagiable cpistemic conditions.. could justify them.
As I've mentioned. Putnam aiticizes Rorty for being a relativist and has devoted some
effon to distinguishing his views from Rorty's. Putnam's abandonment of truth as idealized
rational acceptability is partly a result of this effort, and it changes Putnam's realism by
making it more consistent with his criticism of metaphysical realism. ~I In Words and Life
Putnam refuses to provide a positive theory oftJuth and prefers instead to show how other
so-called solutions to the problem of truth - such as TarsIci's 'disquotationaI' theory and
Rocty's 'agreement. ofores cuIturaJ. peen' venionQ: - are inadequate explanations of the nature
of truth. Putnam argues that to accept that there is nothing interesting to say or theorize
about truth because it has been proven to be a redundant assertion or an empty compliment
is to deny the importance oftruth as a natUTal, intuitive notion; hence Putnam's decision to
n In section 4.13 ofthe next chapter I discuss Rorty's convincing interpretation of
Putnam's idealized rational acceptability and the coocern it raises for Putnam's pragmatism.
Rotty incorporates Putnam's truth theory into his ~tric pragmatism and presents it
as the same position that Putnam has previously criticized as relative.
4J For Putnam's discussion of these ~solutions~ see ~On Truth~ in his Words and Life.
p.315.
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change his realism from inlemaJ to natIINI. Whereas internal realism espouses a positive
theory of truth that is incoDSistc::at: with tbc rat ofPutnam's pragmatism. natural realism
modestly aftc:rs his pragmatism by avoidiIWa diIl:uIIion ofthe details ofa positive theory and..
instead, emphasizes the importance ofour DIdUtIl iDc1ination to search for such a positive
theory. Thus. unlike Rarty, Putnam bc:Iieva there is a problem of truth to be solved by
philosopbcn; howeva'", be cbooses to Ieavc UI with our own intuitions regarding this problem,
and for this reason I think we will benefit. from a brief discussion ofthe earlier theory oftroth
that he has more recently - and reluctantly _retracted.oIl
In &aJism With a Human FDCt! Putnam explains that within each conceptual scheme
truth is idealized rational acceptability. He argues that truth is attained when epistemic
conditions arc ideal enough to allow us to make a clear rational justification for its
verification. The ideali%.ation is based on the cultunl practices of our present conceptual
scheme; and thus it is revisable. Such idealization accounts for the normative elements of
truth and leads Putnam to deny that there can be truth in any system of epistemic conditions
(10 any language or aJhure) that "totaDy outruns the poSS1oility ofjustification."'" Therefore,
for Putnam in Realism With a Human Face, truth is an attribute of those statements which
'" A large component ofthis thesis intends to show that Rorty's and Putnam's versions
of pragmatism (despite Putnam's resistance) are converging at a number of points. My
discussion of Putnam's carliertheory oftruth is meant to help justify this claim. In chapter
four I will return to Putnam's retracted theory through Rorty's criticism ofit in "Putnam
and the Relativist Menace," The JmunaJ ofPhilosoplry. 90 (1993), pp. 443-461; this will
also help accentuate other points ofconvergence.
4' Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. IX.
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·couldbejustified wen epistemic cont6tioIIJ goodentJftgh."' and iUs reason for asserting this
version oftrutb is that there are better IDd worse cpistemic conditions which allow one to
verifY the ttuth of statements. Putnam cmpbuiza that this theory of truth does not limir in
advance what we caD use to verifY stUcmcIds becauJc. although truth is idealized rational
acceptability, the ideal epistemic cooditioDI are DOt pre..establisbed justificatory structures or
any kind of rigid verification criteria.
consequently, this notion oftruth is pnagrnatic, and the beliefs to which it is attached
make a positive impact on the culture, for truth is an ideal parameter by which beliefs are
judged to be better or worse. Our desire to know is satisfied.. but it is satisfied only through
the position we are fated to occupy in lOy case, the position of beings who cannot
have a view of the world that does not reflect our interests and values, but who
are., for all that. committed to regarding some views of the world - and, for that
matter, some interests and values - as better than others.'"
On this version. truth is defined through the ideal justificatory structures which are
pragmatically constructed by a practical reason that is subject to historical change. This view
of truth is not one to satisfy the traditional deDW'lds of metaphysics and epistemology, for
there is no absolute, language-indepc:ndent truth.. Where the metaphysical realist -wants truth
to be something that goes beyond the content of the claim and to be that in virtue ofwhich
the claim is true,··' Putnam $hews that truth cannot go beyond the socio-historical content
'" Putnam, RIa/ism Wirh a Human Face, p. VU.
n Putnam., Realism Wirh a Human Face, p. 178.
.. Putnam., .Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry Into the Powers of the
Human Mind., - T1reJoumaJ ofPhilosophy. 91 (1994), p. SOl.
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and the pragmatic ideals with wbichit isimbual becmJe"truth - that is, the rightness of what
is said - is • normative notion.....
Putnam reitemes that tbiJ notion of trutb is DOt relativism. It is important to
remember thai: even though diff'eraIt c:oo:c:pIUI! schemes allow different correct: explanations
of the same event. there is no need to jc:ttisoD a positive concept of truth and conclude that
all truth is relative. Within each~ IICbemc the ttuth and falsity of statements is
determined in pan by a reality which is partly defined by the conventions ofthe language in
use and partly by the objects or facts that cause the conventions. However,
whiIe there is an aspect ofcottventionality and an aspect offact in everything we
say that is true. we faIl into bopeless pbilosopbical error awe commit a ~fallacy
of division" and conclude that there must be a pan of the truth that is the
"conventional part" and a part that is the "filctua:J part.'"
The 'philosophical error' here would be to attempt to ground a metaphysical notion ofTruth
on one side of a division of filet and coovention. Such a division is an incoherent
metaphysical endeavor wbich eteeed$ the bounds oftanguage and sense.
In hindsight, the above quotation taken from the preface to Realism With a Human
Face has more weight than perhaps it should. That is., it is not surprising that Putnam's
conviction that the fact/value distinction should be dropped~ would make a substantive
theory oftmth difficult to maintain. For if the nonnative and tactual clements of reality are
D Putnam., Renewing Philosophy, p. 17.
50 Putnam., Realism With a Human FOf:%, p. X.
S1 Putnam reiterates this conviction in the preface to Wordsand Life.
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hopelessly bound together, then tJUtb caDDDt really be grounded in an absolute manner
because our normative contnDution is COIdiDgear. Putnam's original intention in his earlier
work was to sbowthat a substantive theory oftruth need not be abandoned just because it's
mixed up with conlingency. However, be later discovered that the difficulty with this insight
is that aD epistemology like Putnam's - CDC that maiDtains that language is an inseparable
mixture oftBct and value - cannot consistcmIy bold such a substantive theory of truth. This
follows because if truth is a substantive Froperty, then there must be something essential
about our normative contribution. Putnam realized that descnbing this essential feature
would render his position open to Rorty's ethnocentric interpretation. Since Putnam cannot
provide a positive nonethnocentric theory of truth, he chooses to focus his anention on
debunking negative theories. While this tactic does not directly support the notion that a
positive or substantive theory of truth can be coherently described, it does suppon the
intuition that there is problem of truth to be considered. Putnam's more recent natural
realism, however, makes no reaJ attempt to address the problem, and he simply retracts his
earlier substantive theory of truth. Putnam's reasons for retracting idealized rational
acceptability will be discussed further in chapter four in which I will show how Rotty's
criticism ofPutnam's pragmatism has brought their versions of pragmatism closer together.
3.3 CONer tJSION
Putnam's natural realism. then, avoids the reductive absolutism of both cultural
relativism and mel8physical realism. By incorporating the common sense notion that it is not
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impossible for language to malce coDtlct with the world, it avoids cultural relativism. and by
including the indeterminacy and normativity of convention, it also avoids metaphysical
absolutism. According to Putnam, the uaioa of fact and value is one that realism cannot do
without. As Putnam tmpbasiz.c:s. we C8IIDOt divide through fact and convention and separate
out the determinate and the indetcrmiDateclcmcms oftnlth. We can make sense ofnetthcr
fact nor convention when we coosida' than u distinct from each olber. Since the real for
Putnam is exactly what our 1anguage-games and theories say it is, then reality is a combination
ofswcs of affairs and the interests that motivate our descriptions oftbose states.
The next chapter will take a closer look at Putnam's and Rorty's versions of
pragmatism. I will argue that when we are done making sense of Putnam's position, it is
muchcloscrto RaTty's than Putnam woukt Iikc to admit, and Putnam's retraction ofms earlier
idealized rational acceptability theory oftnnb is one explicit indication that his and RoTty's
versions ofpragmatism are converging. Punwn's conviction that language does make contact
with the world is the questionable component of his pragmatism and. as I will argue., this
conviction is all that separates their positions. The admission of lhe failure of idealized
rational acceptability is a strong step in RaTty's direction, but Putnam still refuses to abandon
his conviction. As a result, my conclusion in the next chapter is that Putnam must embrace
RoTty's ethnocentric pragmatism or inconsistetrtJy cling to this conviction at the expense of
his own position. In chapter five I will argue that this conviction as well as Putnam's criticism




REAUSM. RELA.TIVISM AND ETIINOCENTIUC PRAGMATISM
The intent oftID chapter is to diK:over" the reasons wby Putnam and Rarty continue
to agree on certain issues of metaphysics, truth, realism and the future of philosophy and
disagree on othen. Both pbibophrn oftiIr wry similar positions OIl these topics. but Putnam
is determined to distinguish his pragmatism from Rorty's. While Rorty claims that his and
Putnam's positions arc esserrtiaIJy the same, Putnam claims that they're quite different., and he
demonstrates this by criticizing Rarty. However, Putnam's criticism of Ratty actually
contradicts his own pragmatism, and if Putnam is to remain consistent. then his position
requires further development.
In a recent articlel Rorty attempts to gel It the UDderIying differences between himself
and Putnam. He first takes five passages from Putnam's Realism Wilh a Human Face and
claims that they are points on which he 'wholeheartedly concurs' with Putnam and that they
summarize the kind of pragmatism that he and Putnam both share. Rarty's list ofPutnam's
passages goes as follows:
(I)...elements ofwhat we call '\anguage' or 'mind' penetrate so ckep/y into what
we call nreality" that the very project ofrepresenting ourselves as being 'mappers of
somelhing 'language-independent' ;s fatally compromised from the start. Like
Relativism, but in a different way. Realism is an impoSSlole attempt to view the world
from Nowhere (RHF 28).
(II) [We should] accept the position we are fated to occupy in any case.. the
position ofbeings who cannot have a view ofthe world that does not reflect our interests
I Rorty, "Putnam and the Relativist Menace," The Journal ofPhilosophy, 90 (1993),
pp.443-461.
and values, but who are, for aU tbIt. committed to regarding some views of the world-
and, for that matter, some interests Uld nJua-u better tbanothers (RHF, 178).
(ID) Wbat Quine coIIcd 'the iJdcIcrmU*Yof_' sbouId ..- be ,,;owed
as the 'inlenst re/ativityqftramitllkJd...'[I]atcrat relativity' contrasts with absoluteness,
not with objectivity. It can be objective dill: an ilIterpretation or aD explanation is the
correct one, g;ven the mtcrests wbicb are rdevmt in the context (RHF 210).
(IV) The bcIrt ofpnsmatism. it... to mo-ofJames' and Dewey's pragmatism,
ifnot ofPtirce's-Wti the insistcnoe on tbe 1IJIRIUKY0fthe Igcnt point ofview. Ifwe
find that we must take a certain point o€view. use. certain 'conceptual system'. when we
are engaged in practical activity, in tbewidelt sease of'practical activity', then we must
DOt simu1tancousIy advance the claim daM it is DOt really 'the way things are in themselves'.
[The Many Faces of&aJism, p. 83]
(V) To say, as [Bernard] Williams sometimes does, that convergence to one big
picture is~ by the very concept of knowledge is sheer dogmatism ... It is. indeed,
the case thai: etIricaJ. koowled8e cannot claim absohrtcness; but that is because the notion
ofabsoluteness is incoherent (RHf 171; roman nwncraIs added).l
Rorty then addresses three other points that Putnam uses in Realism With a Human
Face to separate himself from Rorty's pragmatism. Rorty claims that these three points are
entirely inconsistent with the five passages that summarize their shared pragmatism, and he
argues that in order to avoid this inconsistency Putnam must embrace ethnocentric
pragmarism. The first two controversial points are Putnam's reference to the 'nature ofhuman
life' and Putnam's ootion ofrefonn. The third point ofcontention is one that Putnam himself
has accepted as problematic: the notion of truth as idealized rational acceptability. As r
mentioned in the previous chapter, Putnam's retraction of this earlier theory of truth is
evidence that his natural realism is converging on the ethnocentric pictUre proposed by Rotty.
1 Rotty, "Putnam and the Relativist Menace, ~ The Journal a/Philosophy, 90 (1993), p.
144. With the exception ofpassage IV, the text Rorty is quoting here is Putnam's Realism
With a Human Face. Passage IV is taken from Putnam's TheManyFacesojRealism (see
reference list for complete citations).
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In this chapter I will present Rorty's criticism ofPutnam's earlier theory oftruth in order to
show why Putnam bas since dropped it IDll wiry, without • sensible replacement for idealized
rational acceptability, Putnam's most scosible option is to embrace Rany's disquotational,
ethnocentric picture oftruth.
In the first halfofthis chapter I will explain why Rorty thinks each of these points
corttradicts his and Putnam's own pragmItimL I will show that these contradictions make it
apparent that Putnam's intentions are different from Rarty's. That is, whereas Rorty wishes
to abandon the foundationalism of our philosophical vocabulary by using a different
vocabulary, Putnam's aim is to preserve our philosophical vocabulary while deflating it of
absolutism However, despite Putnam's objections. I will argue that the differences of
intention between Rorty and Putnam are not explicitly found in the final content of their
similar positions. It is true that Putnam is more sympathetic to the tradition of philosophy
than Rarty, but Putnam's sympathy douds his pngmatism. and we are left to interpret a rather
undeveloped position.
Therefore, the later halfofthiscbapterwilI analyze Putnam's use ofcertain concepts-
representation, tnJth and realism - in order to clarifY his pragmatism and free it of self-
contradiction. My analysis will first show that in order to escape mystery and contradiction,
Putnam's use ofthese concepts needs explanation. I will argue that once we add the missing
explanation, the content ofPutnam's pragmatism is essentially the same as Rorty's.
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1 1 Part ,- pe+ngz (ir Drrc CHtrJdictiops
4.11 TIlE NATIJRE OF HUMAN LIFE
InRealism With a Human Fau Putnam critiQzes Rorty's zealous desire to abandon
issues like the reali.sm-antirealism debate. Putnam claims that we cannot simply ignore
philosophical controversies bccaux -the iDusions that philosophy spins are illusions that
belong to the nature of human life itself-J Rorty is surprised at Putnam's reference to the
'nature of human life' and responds to Putnam by charging that he is ·too kind to the
problematic and vocabulary ofmodem philosophy." Such a vocabulary, argues Rorty, is not
compatible with the kind of pragmatism espoused in the five passages on which they
wholeheartedly concur.
The nalure ofhuman life? For aU the ages to come? Talk about lhe nature of
human life docs oot fit in weD with the pragmatism sketched in (I) -{v) above, nor
with Putnam's view...that ·our norms and standards of warranted
assertibility...evolve in time. oS
There are romcrous passages such as this in -The Relativist Menace" where Rofly is
perplexed at Putnam's apparent contradiction of his own philosophical position. Rorty notes
that, at times., Putrwn olren devastating criticism of modem, foundatianalist philosophy and
J Putnam. Realism Wilh a Human Face, p. 20.
4 RaTty, ·Putnam and the Relativist Menace,· 'I'M Journal ofPhilosophy, 90 (1993), p.
445.
5 RaTty, ·Putnam and the Relativist Menace," 'I'M Journal ofPhilosophy, 90 (1993), p.
446.
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in the same breath evokes foundatiouaIist 1dt about the nature ofhuman life. He argues that
if Putnam is to remain consistc:Dt with his c:ritique of modern foundationalism and
metaphysical realism. as weD. as remaining consistcm: with his professed pragmatism, then he
cannot use the vocabulary of these iocobcralt philosophical movemenu.
At this point we get the first glimpse at the difference between Putnam's and Rorty's
intentions. Putnam's daire to preserve !lIbItantiIl notioos ofrepresentation, truth and realism
is much mongel" than Rorty's. and this is evident in the fact that Putnam risks mystery and
contradiction through refusal to reject the vocabuJary. Rorty feels no need to stand close to
the tradition that he is attempting to overcome and therefore abandons that tradition's
vocabulary.
However. two controversial issues remain that will shed light on Putnam's intentions
with regard to natural realism. 1be lint of these two is Rorty's problem with Putnam's
concept of refonn.
4 12lHE PRINCIPLE OF REFORM
I will show that Putnam's principle of reform is actually incompatible with Putnam's
pragmatism, and, so far, only Rorty's serwble interpretation ofPutnarn's principle avoids the
contradiction. Putnam's principle of reform goes as foUows:
Our norms and standards ofanything-including warranted assertibility-
are capable ofreform. There are better and wone norms and standards.6
6 Putnam, Rea/ism With a Human Face. p. 21.
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In his Consequences ofPragmatism Rorty's venioa ofthe reform principle states that:
in the process of playing vocabuIaria tad cuftures off against eacb other, we
produce new aad better ways oftaIkiDg tad 1CIing-not better by reference /0 a
previOllSIy A:nrown s1Dndard, butjut bater in the sense that Iltey come /0 seem
clearly bener than their pndeasson..7 (my italics)
Putnam argues that this formul8tioa oftbc priDcipIe ofrefonn is actually -a rejection, rather
it is relativistic and does not include any substmtiaJ ootion of reform. Putnam argues that
it is intemel to our pietw"e of "reform" that whether the outcome ofa change is
good (arcfonn) orbed (the opposite) is logically independent of whether it seems
good or bad. (That is why it makes sense to argue that something most people
take to be a refonn in fact isn't one).'
For Punwn the possibility that reforms are determined as good or bad according to whether
a society feels them to be good or bad is relativistic because any change, even fascism, could
then be considered a refonn It is this poSSIbility that makes Putnam uncornfonable with
Rorty's notion of reform.
Rorty takes the opponunity in "The Relativist Menace" to express his ethnocentric,
anti-relativist strategy, and he responds to Putnam by revising his original formulation of
reform in Consequences of Pragmatism to avoid the charge of relativism. The revision
changes the original formulation of reforms as those changes which 'come to seem clearly
better than their predecessors' to the more explicitly ethnocentric version ofchanges which
'Rony, Consequences ofPragmatism, p. xxxvn.
• Putnam, Rea/ism With a Human Face, p. 23.
'Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. 24.
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~come to seem 10 US clearly better than their predecessors. RIO And by 'us' Rorty means
"language wen whom we can recognize u better versions ofourseIves.~11
Thus. Rony emphasizes the poiDI: that: it is the politics and ethics of the particular
society under examination that detaminc wbetber reforms are good. or bad. Social change,
claims Rorty, can only be interpn:tcd tbrousb the interests and values of the individual
societies tbIt effect such change. This does meaD thIt there are many different standards of
reform and that something like lBscism cannot be excluded. but. as Rorty points out. how can
it be otherwise? Since we cannot step outside the politics and ethics ofour society. our
judgementS regarding reform. and our standards ofwunnted assertibility must remain within
these social structures as well.
At this point it is important that we consider whether Rorty is correct in claiming that
Putnam's vocabuJary is too kind to modem philosophy or whether he simply misunderstands
Putnam's position. Does Putnam's natural realism include something that Rorty fails to see?
If so, then perhaps Rotty is wrong in asserting that Putnam'S work is riddled with
contradiction and that he should emb~ ethnocentric pragmatism. But to argue that Rorty
has misunderstood Putnam here is to oversimplify a complex relationship between two
philosophers who, while offering very similar and final criticisms of foundationalist
LO Rorty. ·Putnam and the Relativist Menace,· The JoumaJ ofPhilosophy, 90 (1993),
p.453.
11 Rorty. "Putnam and the Relativist Menace,· The Journal ofPhilosophy. 90 (1993).
p.454.
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philosophy, have very subtle recommeDlimioos for the continued practice of philosophy
without foundations. A clear example ofdais kiod ofovenimplification occurs in a recent
article by Jennifer Case in the SmahemJOlll7ta1 ofPhilosophy.
However, it is not the oversimpticaDoo that is most important here. Rather, In
respoose to Rorty's interpretation ofPlltMm'. DItUr&I realism, Case, in beT article, "Rorty and
Putnam: Separate and Unequal," argues that "RDrty fails to undermine a significant portion
of Putnam's criticism."1l Case argues that Putrwn', pragmatism is separate from Rorty's
because Putnam's principle of refonn is incompatible with Rotty's pragmatism. But I will
show that Case's arguments are unsound, and, therefore, she has failed to distinguish
Putnam's position from Rorty's. To be more precise and to repeat my point here, Case does
show that Putnam's intentions (to salvage truth and realism) are different from Rorty's
intentions (to abandon truth and realism), but she fails to show how their versions of
pragmatism differ as a result.
According to Case, Rorty's mised., ethnocentric endorsement ofthe refonn principle
misses the point ofPutnam's original criticism. She states:
Putnam's criticism is no less effective after the adjustment ["seems 10 us1 than it
was before. If it is the case that whether a change is a refonn is logically
independent of whether its outcome seems good or bad., then whether a change
12 Case, "Rotty and Putnam: Separate and Unequal," The Southern Journal of
Philosophy, 33 (1995), p. 170.
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is a reform is iogicaIIy independent ofwhether its outcome seems good or bad to
u.s or, for that matter, to anyot'IC'.lJ
But rt seems to me that bere Case misses Rorty'l poiatl By adjusting his principle ofrefonn
to make it more explicitly ethnoc:cntric Ratty is empbasizing the notion that appeals to
nonsocioIogicaI standards for logical iDdepeDdeace do DOt acc:ord with either his or Putnam's
pragmatism. In fact, it ffies in the face oftile lICCODd of the five points that summarize their
(We should] accept the position we are fated to occupy in any case, the position
ofbc:ings who cannot have a view ofthe wortd that does not reflect our interests
and values, but who are, for all that, committed to regarding some views of the
world-and., for that matter, some interests and values-as better than others. l~
Ifnature has placed us within a world ofour interests and values, then where exactly
can we look for the logical independmc:e that Putnam wants here? If our standards of reform
are logically independent of whether the outcome ofa refonn seems good or bad to us, then
they must lie outside our world in some kind of absolute Platonic realm. But surely Putnam
would R1iect the notion ofPlatonic fonns as logically independent standards of reform. Such
eternal and static ideals embody the Icind of absolutist metaphysical talk that he is trying to
ovm:ome. Rorty's revised refonn principle is quick: to point out that anyone who places our
standards ofrefonn in some outside realm which is logically independent of our judgements
is simply not making sense. After all, they are OIlT standards. The problem then is making
Il Case, -Rorty and Putnam: Separate and Unequal,- The Southern Journal of
Philosophy, 33 (1995), p. 173.
l~ Putnam, Rea/ism With a Human Face, p. 178.
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sense ofPutnam's use oftbe conc:eptS ofwarrut aDd logical independence without reference
to absolute standards.
What can Putnam mean when be says that 'whether the outcome ofa change is good
(a reform) or bad (a corruption) is logically iDdependent ofwbether it seems good or bad'?
Also. wbat can Case possibly mean when she says that 'whether a change is a reform is
logically indepeodcut ofwbetber its ouaoome seems good or bad ... to anyone"? The only
possibility that I can suggest is that Putnam. and Case simply mean that anyone can make a
mistake about whether a change is a reform or a corruption. Consequendy, a majority can
be mistaken in its assessment ofa minority opposition and, therefore, what a minority says
is a reform can conceivably be a reform despite the majority's claim that it is a corruption.
This meaning of 'logical independence' makes perfect sense. but it is rather empty as a
standard ofjudgement until it is imbued with nonnative content. [t is true that whether a
change is a reform is 'logical1y independent' ofwhether its outcome seems good or bad; but
sociological standards ofjustification are still necessary to determine the nonnative status of
that change, that is., to determine whether it is a refonn or a corruption. Ultimately. the truth
in a minority's claim may be so, but it is not realized and has no force without justification.
and for the truth to be justified the majority must sway in the direction of the claim.
This interpretation of Putnam's notion oflogically independent standards ofrefonn
seems to me to be morecoha'ent with the rest ofPutnam's pragmatism. For example. unlike
the uncertain importance that Case and Putnam seem to give logical independence. this
modest ethnocentric interpretation supports PutDam's statement that: "our norms or standards
BO
of warn:ntcd lSSU'bbility are hiaoric:aJ products; they evolve over time. _u However, this
notioo oClogicaI independence &its to c:xpras~ more substantial about standards of
reform. thaD Rorty's ethnocentric accouId: does.
Both Cue and Putnam arpae that a SIaDdard ofreform must be logically independent
oftheoptnion ofthe majority for it to bereoJly justified, but the only plausible interpretation
oflogicaIly independent standards briDgsjultificllion bIck to the opinion ofa majority. Do
Putnam and Case miss the point of Rorty's ethnocem:rism and prematurely dismiss it as
rdabvistic? The following is what I think is happening here..
On the one band, Rorty is using the c::omept 'rdOnn' in its naive scme; that is, 'reform'
Iaclcs phOOsopbicaJ (metaphysical) weight: and simply means what seems better to us. On the
other hand, Putnam wants to attach philosophical importance to his concept of reform.; that
is, in spite of his suggested moratorium on metaphysics and epistemology, he wants to
preserve a philosophical concept of reform that will nevtr make room for certain beliefs that
he considen to be unacceptable. Putnam wants an anti-absolutist pragmatism which has at
least one absolute. lbis he cannot have.
Again it is evident that Pun:wn does not want to abandon the voeabula:ry of the
tradition and lose the rnoBI a:xnfort that modem faundatiooalism had to offer (even ifit never
made sense). Ucless Putnam or Cue <:all cxpIain whit PutIwn means by a standard of reform
that is logicaUy independent of what mermen think, then we are left: with one of three
1$ Putnam, Rea/ism With a HII1tf(In Fa«, p. 21.
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possible options. In increasing order of credibility they are: leave the Dotion of logically
independc:nr: standard of reform as a coatradiction; leave it as a mystery, or attempt to make
sense of it. However, as it twDS out, the only sense that bas been made of logically
independent standards ofrefonn thus wis by Rorty IDd his sociological version ofrefonn.
The mystery, on the other band, dc:epaIswbaa wcCllllSidc:rtbat the first of Putnam's passages
listed by Rorty states:
elements ofwbat we call-language- or -mind" penetrate so deeply into what we
call "na!ity" that. the very project ofrepresenting ourselves as being ~mappers"
ofsomething "language independent" isjakJly compromisedfrom the start. 16
When observed in the light ofthis passage., a passage that is crucial to both Putnam's critique
ofmetaphysical realism and his natunl realism, it is very difficult to see what he could mean
by logically independe:nt standards ofrefonn Unless he is willing to reveal the mystery, then
the only sensible option here is Rony's.
Another area where Putnam stops short of the mark is his eaclier theory of truth as
idealized rational aoceptabiIity. Rorty takes Putnam to task: on this rather vague concept and
attempts 10 make sense ofit. However, in response to Ratty's criticism and his assimilation
ofPutnam's position to his own ethnocentric pragmatism, Putnam rescinds idealized rational
u:ceptabiIity rB1herthan accept what he consi~ to be a culturally relative version of truth.
The next section will present Ratty's interpretation of Putnam's earlier theory of truth and
examine why Putnam refuses to accept it.
I' Putnam, Rea/ism With a Human Face, p. 28.
• 2
4 IJ IDEALIZEJ) RATIONAL ACCEPTABUJrY
Originally. inRlason, TruthandHistorylDd&aJism With a Human Face, Putnam
presents idealized rational acceptability as a theory oftnrth that is nonabsolute and., at the
same time. nonreIative; but, argues Rorty, this theory of truth is inconsistent with the
pragmatism that be and Putnam both shaM. rn an 8ttempt to make sense of ideali%ed rational
acceptability Rotty finds that it must either be reduced to ethnocentrism or left as a
contradiction; however, we must first review Putnam's attempt at a nonrelativelnonabsolute
version of truth.
As t discussed in section 3.2 of the previous chapter, Putnam introduces his earlier
idealized rational. acceptability as a way to explain truth. On this view truth is attained when
epistemic conditions are ideal enough to allow us to make a clear. rational justification for its
verification. Putnam initially considers this version oftrutb to be nonabsolute because the
idea1i.z.ation here is based on the cultural practices of a particular conceptual scheme; thus
truth cannot outnm the possibility ofjustification. However, it is the label'nonrelative' that
Putnam has had difficulty justifYing here.
Putnam explains that truth for the natural realist is not entirely constructed by the
contingent practices of different cultures or forms of life. He says that "In ordinal)'
circumstances., there is usually a/acl oflhe matter as to whether the statements people make
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are warranted or not.- I1 (my italics) And when the reasons we give for uttering warranted
statements are justified within ideal cpistc:mic: CODditions.. then these statements are true.
However, we must remembcl" that this truth is QOt: absolute because our statements and our
reasons for justifying them change as our practices change.
Rorty's puzzlement in "The Relativist Menace- concerns Putnam's use of'filet of the
matter' with regard to warrant. In RealisM With a Hvmon Face Putnam aetUaIIy anticipates
Rorty's reaction here and states that "Rorty is certain to disagree [with Putnam's use of'fact
ofthematter'].~ll Putnam claims that assertions are warranted because there is a 'fact of the
matter' which makes them so; but, unfortunately, he does not teU us why he thinks Rony
would object to this claim. And since Putnam doesn't explain why he is certain that Rorty will
disagree with 'fact ofthe matter'. then we have little to work with. At least Rony makes an
attempt.
For Rorty warrant is -a sociological matter, to be ascertained by observing the
receptionofS's statement by her peers.-" And be explains that if this is what Putnam means
by 'fact of the matter,' then he !las no disagreement. But Putnam also states that ~whether a
statement is warranted or not is independent ofwhether the majority of one's cultural peers
n Putnam, Realism With a Human Foce, p. 21.
II Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. 21.
I' Rorty, -Putnam and the Relativist Menace,- The Journal ofPhilosophy, 90 (1993),
p.449.
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would $OJ' it is wamrtted or lJJJWIrI'IIUd.a TIus., we know that an exclusively sociological
explanation ofwamDt is unacceptable for Putnam. But bow can warrant be independent of
the agreement of one's cultural peen? AccordiDg to Putnam I am warranted in asserting p
because the epi5temic condition.s under which I assert P ace ideal enough for me to justifY p.
But what warrants me in asserting that the epistcmic conditions are in fact ideal? Unless I
have recourse to some other DOD5OCioIogica1 standard, then I must make an additional
assertion. q. to establish which epistemic conditions ace the best one's in which to assert p.
And so Putnam's notion of truth as idealized rational acceptability is reduced to a regress of
warranted assertions.
Rorty therefore attempts to make sense ofW8Il1lDl from a nonscriological perspective.
But the problem is that any nonsociological explanation of warrant conflicts with the
pragmatism that is sununed up in the five of Putnam's passages that Rorty listed earlier. For
example., passage (I) states:
e1ernentsofwhat we call 'language' or'miDd' pmetrote so deeply into what we call
"reality" that tM very project ofrepresenting ourselves as being 'mapper's of
something 'language-independent'isfatally compromisedfrom the stort. l1
From this passage it is clear that Putnam's vague fact of the matter explanation of warrant is
certainly not independent of language and cultural opinion. Putnam has argued that
metaphysical realism is inconsistent because it fails to account for the contingent structures
20 Putnam, Realism WiJlr aHuman Face, p. 21.
21 Putnam, Realism WiJlr a Human Face. p. 28.
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of our language which are partly shaped through our interests and values. It is therefore
puzzling that Putnam would contend that ourjudsrmcr:a ofwarranted assembility. which are
ultimately der:ermined by our intc:rc:sts IIId vaIucs. are both Iinguistically structured and
Donsociological.
This brings me to another problem that Jezmifer Case has with RoTty's interpretation
ofPutnaJn's work, a problem tbatc::oocems Rorty's insistence that in the face of the problems
with idealized ralional acceptability Putnam is 'poised to embrace' ethnocentrism. Case argues
that in his attempts to make sense of Putnam's notion of truth as idealized rational
acceptability Rorty -begs the question against the poSSIbility of making sense ofme notion
ofidealiz.ed rational acceptability wilhout reference to an ideal community. d2 However, as
Rony puts it in -The Relativist Menace-:
I cannot see what rtdealized rational acceptability' can mean except -acceptability
to an ideal community.- Nor can I see how. given that no such community is
going to have a God's eye view, this ideal community can be anything more than
liS as we should like to be. Nor can I see what 'us' can mean here except: us
educated, sophisticated, tolerant. wet liberals... the sort of people, in short, who
both Putnam and I hope, at our best. to be.D
Rorty continues and challenges Putnam to either make sense ofidealized rational acceptability
or to propose another version ofan ideal community.
Z2 Case, -Rorty and Putnam: Separate and Unequal, - The Southern Journal of
Philosophy, 33 (I995), p. 177.
D Rorty, -Putnam and the Relativist Menace.,- The Jouma/ofPhilosophy, 90 (I993).
p.451.
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At this point Case comes to Putnam's aid and chacges RoTty with circularity. She
states that:
Rorty's inability to -see lIlIY promise- in this alternative is
inconsequential....Putnam, for ODC, caries OD as though be does see promise in
theahemative Ronydismisses....Butaayappcal tovisioos ofpromise that Putnam
might make would count no more in favor of his understanding of idealized
rational acceptability than Rorty's -weU to alack ofvision counts against it. 24
What Case fails to consider here is that~ ratiOD&l acceptability is Putnam's creation,
and he has offered no clear explanation of it. Rorty has made an attempt and his explanation
is thaJ: it means acceptability to an ideaJ oonmulityofwa bberals. In other words Rorty may
beg the question in favor of ethnocentrism by not offering justification for the claim that
idealized rational acceptability cannot be anything other than acceptability to an ideal
conununity, but Case's charge is inappropriate because no other alternative explanation has
beeo offered, oat even by Putnam. Rorty cannot be charged for his inability to provide
another explanation.
Ultimately. the problem here • a problem that Putnam himself eventually accepts in
Words and Life - is that any notion ofideal, or indeed, any notion of rational acceptability,
in order to make sense. must be given shape or meaning by something human; that is.
something sociological and contingent. The notion of idealized rational acceptability is
therefore faced with an ethnocentric explanation or it is void ofcontent. Perhaps Rorty did
not think. this point needed mentioning. Regardless. the onus here is clearly on Putnam 10
24 Case. -Rafty and Putnam: Separate and Unequal.·. The Southern Journal of
Philosophy, 33 (1995), p. 177.
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give some nonethnoceotric meaning to idQIized rational acceptability by explaining how
1anguage can make substantive c::oruct with the world, orelse be must embrace ethnocentrism
and the view that there is no such coatKt. Ullfortunately, Putnam does not revise his
idealized rational acceptability and provide us with this missing explanation.
The problems Putnam CIlCOUJden with bis earlier theory of truth are the same
problems be encounters when be insists that in order for a change to be a reform it must be
judged from a standard that is logically ;ndepende,,' ofwhether it seems good or bad - a
point that Jennifer Case fails to mention. The 'logical independence of standards of
judgements ofrefonn' is equaIIy as vague as ideaIiml rational acceptability. Putnam provides
no explanation of these terms and Case adds nothing to his cause
Unless I am missing someone's point here, Case fails in her defense of Putnam's
natural reaJism against Rorty's ethnocentrism. However, Case does help highlight the central
point ofdeparture between Rorty and Putnam. That is, unlike Rotty, Putnam is unwilling to
completely abandon a substantive notion oftruth. While Putnam's and Rotty's criticisms of
contemporuy foundationalism are essentially the same, Putnam still insists that there is
something worthwhile that remains of philosophy, but be cannot yet explain it. (would
suggest that at this point Putnam should reconsider the possibility that Ratty's ethnocentric
pragmatism may not be a case ofinconsistent relativism after all.
But is it possible that Rorty is misunderstanding Putnam's position and failing to see
where Putnam's project is heading? Ifso, then I fail here as well. Case, however, seems to
think that Putnam is on to something, but she makes no attempt at an explanation and seems
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content to wait for Putnam to come forward with ODe. I can colJUIJCDd Putnam for his
patience (at times it does seem that Rorty is in a Imry). but this catainIy doesn't mean that
his project is onto something new which will save philosophy from the perils of
postmodemism. I hope it does. but PutDIIn will Deed more than mysterious optimism ifhe
is to make sense of natun.I realism.
414 SIJMMARY
Rorty's three points of concern with Putnam's natural realism have now been made
clear. Firstly, Rolty demonstrates that Putnam's use ofmodem vocabulary with talk about
the nature ofhumanlife leads him to contradict the body or his professed pragmatism which
supposedly excludes such absolutist coocepu. Rorty also shows that Putnam's notion ofa
nonsociologica1 principle of reform that is in some way logically independent from human
interests cannot be reconciled with Putnam's own pragmatism or, more precisely, with his
view of the depth oflanguage. And, lastly, Rorty's ethnocentric interpretation ofPumam's
notion of truth as idealized rational acceptability is the only complete and substantial
presentation ofthis vague concept The way Putnam presents idealized rational acceptability
in Rea/ism With a Human Face is inconsistent with his commitment to a
nonabsolutelnonrelative notion of truth. At least PutIwn has acknowledged the problem with
this theoryof~ however be has simply dropped it without any positive replacement, and
therefore his convictions that language does make contact with the world and that there is a
problem of truth are lacking philosophical support.
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However. to be more charitable to Pumam, perhaps his concepts of the nature of
human life, logical independence and idalized rational acceptability do contain components
that avoid these inconsistencies. But these compooents have yet to be clearly explained, and
for the time being Rorty's interpretab.oas oftbem seem the most sensible. In my judgement
Rony is not rnisunderswldiD Putnam; Rorty is rDICI'dy trying to make sense of a position that
is not yet clearly developed. Cue evm admits that:
for the time being, there is simply no fomwlating Putnam's "position." There are
better and worse interpretations of what Putnam is up to. however. and Ratty's
interpretation is one ofthe latter.l'
[ find this claim to be entirely unsubstantiated. I concur with Rorty. and since Putnam'S
attempts to make his case are shrouded in mystery. and Case offers no interpretation of her
own, Rorty's interpretation is the only one available. So where are the better interpretations
that Case mentions?
What I think is most important about Rorty's interpretation ofPutnarn's work is that
we can now clearly isolate their different inteotions. After his critique of metaphysical realism
Putnam intends to salvage certain parts of the tradition of philosophy (representation, truth
and realism) and incorpome traditional concepts into his pragmatism. Rorty intends to leave
these concepts behind with the tradition
Now that Putnam's intentions have been clearly identified as distinct from Rorty's, it
remains to be seen whether these different intennons result in a different theory of
l' Case.. "Rorty and Putnun: Separate and Unequal,· 1he Southern Journal of
Philosophy. 33 (1995). p. 176.
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pragmatism. A3 I intend to prove in the DeXt section of this chapter, in Putnam's case.. his
patiently optimistic intentions do not cuimiute in a coberent pragmatism. What we are left
with after Putnam bas rested his case is a vague and mysterious position that needs a
demystifyins interpretation. The UDfixtuDat.eJ*1 here is that the demystification of Putnam's
pragmatism reduces his hopeful attempt It salvaging representation, truth and realism to a
rejection of these concepts. Unless Putnam. or anyODC for that matter, can clarify what he
means by the 'nature ofbwnan life; 'IogicaDy independertt standards of reform,' and the notion
that language does sometimes make contact with the world, we can either deem his project
a faiJure or wait in mystified suspense. Rorty has already offered coherent interpretations of
these notions. and the remainder of this chapter will determine whether Putnam should
reconsider them.
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4.2 rId 2" JJcdn:tnn'u" ........, PrguPsm
N we have just seen, both Rorty .... PutDI:m make remarkably similar cases against
metaphysical realism. Tbere:fore, it is not swpriIiDg that the kinds of pragmatism that they
offer in its stead are also very simiJar. Rorty acknowledges this similarity and often provokes
Putnam by referring to Putnam's pragmatisln as if it were the same as his ethnocentric
pragmatism. Putnam., however. disagrees. claimiD8 that Rorty's pragmatism is an obvious
fonn ofsdf-refuting relativism and that his own prqmatism is not. I will show that, despite
Putnam's resistance to Rarty's assimilation of their positions. Rorty's interpretation of
Putnam's pngmatism is the only one that makes sense. Since Putnam is the dissenter here we
rt1lSl determine whether his attempts to distance himselffrom Rotty's version ofpragmatism
are successful.
Rorty's position is quite clear about the role of philosophy after metaphysical realism,
but Putnam, as usuaJ, is not content to abandon representation, truth and realism just yet. He
is still attempting to work things out. l1UIt. is, be refuses to allow metaphysics and
epistemology to fall with modem foundationalism, at least not without making attempts to
salvage anything useful that might still remain. This sentiment is summed up nicely in the
opening sentence to Putnam's Dewey Lectures., delivered at Columbia University in March
of 1994:
The besetting sin of philosophers seems to be throwing the baby out with the
bathwater. From the beginning, each 'new wa~ of philosopbers has simply
ignored the insights of the previous wave in the course of advancing its own.
Today, we stand near the end ora century in which there have been many new
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insights in philosophy; but at the same time there bas been an unprecedented
forgetting ofthe insights ofprevious centuria aDd millennia.1.6
The fact that Putnam bas not yet professed to have abandoned the traditional
vocabulary of modem philosophy means that be bas IlOt yet finished a complete analysis of
the poSSlbiIity that these concepts can still have useful roles in the contemporary vocabulary
of philosophy. And this is where he ditfen from Rorty. Putnam remains optimistic that
postmodem philosophy does DOt have to rrJect everything from the tradition that it is
succeeding. Whereas Rorty believes that the consequences of his arguments agains!:
metaphysical realism mean leaving traditional philosophical problems behind., Putnam argues
that the incoherence of metaphysical reaIi.sm and traditional philosophical problems does not
warrant such a ban on philosophy. Putnam proceeds to redefine words like 'representation',
'truth' and 'realism' in order to re-invisorate and re-establish the old vocabulary with what he
considers to be the insights ofWrttgenstcin's later philosophy. However. as I intend to show.
the result to date, regardless of Putnam's intentions. is a version of pragmatism that actually
looks and feels like Rorty's.
Thus, the remainder of this chapter will assess Putnam's auempts to preserve the
traditional vocabuJary of philosophy with a renewed philosophy that has been purified of
foundationalist metaphysics. This assessment will also consider whether the distance these
attempts create between Putnam and Rorty is actually as great as Putnam claims. Firstly. I
1.6 Putnam, ·Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry Into the Powers of the
Human Mind," The Journal ofPhilosophy. 91 (1994), p. 445.
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will present Putnam's renewed COftCC1lU of~OD, truth, and realism as they are
explained in his more rec:ad: work.. ADd.1eCODdJy, ( 'WiIJ show that Putnam's use oftbese
moewed """""" ~ quite COOlpObbIe _Ilorly's <tbDocamic pngnwism.
My conclusion ben is that PutDan fails to diItinguisb his pragmatism from Rorty's.
Putnam's inlentions. as (expIaiDed ill the previous IeCtiorl, are certainJy different from Rorty's
(Putnam inteods to saJvage substamiaJ DOtioos ofrepresenwion, truth and realism whereas
Rorty intends to drop them). However. ( wiD now argue that Putnam fails to justify and
suppon his intentions with a coherent theory of pragmatism. IfPutnarn's pragmatism is to
be coherent., then he must end his sympathy for the tradition. reconsider his conviction that
there is a problem of truth and, as Rorty argues, embrace ethnocentric pragmatism. This
means that Putnam would then be opening himsclfup to what some ofRorty's critics call
relativist consequences. However. ( will show thai: these aities (PutnalIl included) are
mistaken.
4 21 REPRESENTATION
On a m.unber ofocca.sion5 Putnam has made quite explicit attempts to distinguish his
views from those ofRorty. Since (am assimilating their views, I will attend to a recent and
thorough attempt of Putnam's to distance himselffrom Rorty.
In his west book. Words andLife. Putnam, in~ with John McDowell. argues
that Rorty prematurely dismisses the notion of representing minds. He points out that it is
the assumption that thoughts are symbols which are independent of what lies outside them
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that leads to this premature dismissal. Like Rorty, Putnam explains that if thoughts are
entirdy independent syoDol:s, then any direct com:spoDdence between thought and the world
can only be estabIisbc:d via some mysterious fOra: ofrd"ermce. Putnam also endorses RoTty's
refusal to appeal to mysterious forces to establish reference, but he disagrees with RoTty's
conclusion that. we should drop the emire ootion of representation. Putnam considers a
possibility of representation that be says Rorty overlooks: the possibility that thinking is the
manipulation of items that do have some intrinsic relation to what is outside the head.
Putrwn states:
We can even agree with Rorty that the idea that there is a genuine problem about
"bow language hooks on to the world- is one we should get over, but we should
not get over it by reviving Bergson's unfottunate idea that, since language is
rightly viewed as a product of evolution, our statements and verbalized thoughts
should be viewed as simply tools which enable w to survive as opposed to correct
representations. Rather we should reject the assumption that thinking is
manipulating items with no intrinsic relation to what is outside the head. lI
The rejection of the a.ssumption that thought is independent of the outside world,
argues Putnam, makes it possible to have "representation without representations.dl: Without
this assumption thinking can be postulated as the manipulation of items that do have some
intrinsic relation to what is outside the head, as opposed to symbols which do not have such
an intrinsic relation. According to Putnam, the intrinsic relation between objects and thought
in representation without representations is that relation fixed by both the grammatical and
11 Putnam, Words" and Life, p. 307.
~ See Putnam's "Representation-, Wordrand lift, pp. 306-308.
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cultunll practices of the language game IIId the objects around which the vocabulary and
practice are fanned. Additionally, the items maaipulated here are not symbolic stand-ins for
real objects. These items, as the toIteItofourtlKJugbts, are "individuated in part by the sort
ofenviromnel1s we inhabit, and therefore. ..'memiDgs arm't in the bead'"l!J because thoughts
are simply "exercises of object-iDvoMog 1bi1ities." Jll These abilities are nonmysterious.
practical abilities that enable us to represc::Dt ob;c:cts. not with object-independent mental
symbols, but by incorporating objects into a linguistic system in which meaning is the
pragmatic compound ofboth the objects and our interpretations of them.
On this nonsymbolic modcl of representation, says Putnam, there can be COrTect
representations.
Given a definite language in place and a definite scheme of "objects.,• the relation
between "words and objects" is DOt at all indescn"bable; but it docs not have a
single melaphysitXllly privileged description any more than thc objects do. In
sum, we can think ofour words and thoughts as having detcnninate reference to
objects (when it is clear what sort of "objects" we are talking about and what
vocabulary we are using); but there is DO one fixed sense of"referenceft involved.
Accepting the ubiquity of conceptual relativity does DOt require us to deny that
truth gcnuineJy depends on the behavior ofthings distant from the speaker. but the
naturc of the dependence changes as the kinds of language games we invent
change,ll
2!1 Putnam, Words and Life, p. 306.
)0 Putnam, Words and Life, p. 306,
II Putnam, WordsandLife, p. 309.
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This model ofrepreseutation takes much of the mystery out ofrepresemation and
reference by doing away with the notion that Itlpl'elleIItatom are entirely in the bead. This
can be accomplished, says Putnam, ifwe
distinguish carefulJy between the activity of ~representation~ (as something in
which we engage) and the idea of. -repreaeotatioo- as an interface between
ourselves and what we think about aDd to UJKlerstand that giving up the idea of
representations as interfaces requiriDa • -semantics· is Dot the same thing as
giving up on the whole idea ofrepraeal8tion.n
According to Putnam, Rorty's dismissal ofrepreseota:tion(and alllhat goes with this dismissal
- truth, realism, etc.) on the grounds that it requires magical powers of reference is premature,
for he does not stop to consider this middle ground. But is this middle ground as different
from Rorty's own position as Putnam would like?
It seems that, despite Putnam's criticism of Rorty's naturalistic view of language.
representation without representations does not contradict the notion that language can be
a complicated, evolutionaty survival tool As Putnam states., the representations in his model
arc not fixed in the metaphysical sense. I think Rorty would have no objection at this point,
But Putrwn does claim that something is represented in language and that this representation
is not an independent mental symbol or meaning rather, it is a product that is dependent on
the interplay of both the world and human convention. Each representation is fixed by the
vocabulary we use in describing the world. But what do these representations represent?
n Putnam, ~Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An lnquiry Into the Powers ofthe
Human Mind,· The Journal ofPhilosophy. 91 (1994). p. 505.
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That is. what are the objects outside the bead that are represented by language? Putnam's
opposition to metaphysical realism will DOt allow him to place these objects outside of
languase, .so by outside the bead he c:umot mean outside of language.
To return to my original point. it seems tbal Putnam's theory of representation does
not contradict Rorty's Darwinian picture ofJansua8e. If representation in language operates
as Putnam describes it - as an object-iDvolving ability whose only intrinsic relation to the
world is one that is fixed through that vocabulary and the conventions ofa language game -
then it is difficult to see why Putnam doesn't make the further claim that this ability does
nothing more than enable us to succcssful}y cope with the world. Are Putnam's
representations anything more than the marks and noises that Rort)' says comprise language?
I think that Ratty would readily accept the notion that Putnam's representations as object-
involving abilities are effective survival tools. Putnam insists, however, that these
representations are more thanjust maries aDd noises because they are sometimes accurate; that
is, sometimes these representations are meaningful and accurately represent the world. But
the imponant point to consider here is that both the world and the accuracy of our
representations are defined within the parmneters ofthe language game in use. Such accuracy
is the same as Rorty's claim to acamcy when he argues that a tolerant, liberal society is the
better society. Rorty caIIs this accuracy ofrepresentation ethnocentrism and claims that these
are the parameters ofaccuracy laid down by the vocabulary and convention of his tolerant,
liberal, North American language-game.
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A£ far as I can tell tbeanlypdllemltclrtywwld baYebere is that Putnam's use ofme
'mn~'could be ............ fix- why doa PIdnom use a metapbys;cally load«!
word that is so t:bdy usociated with the liJuadM:ioaaIis tnditioo when we can just drop it
and cb:x>se ocbc" words? But Putnam bas givca~on a DeW, oonuaditional sense.
And with this new sense he means In object-invoJving ability that does not entail any
epistemological split between Iaaguage aid the world. for outside the head does not mean
outside the language game. Thus. the eplstemoWgy that Putnam is offering is more like a
'meta.q:.isternology' which says that epistemologies are determined by the scmaotics oftile
Ianguage-game in which they occur. Seen ill. tms &gtt., Pumam's epistemology is a remarbble
formulation ofRorty's ethnocentrism.
Ultimatdy, the repre:sentaDons in Putnam's model can be oothing more lhan contextual
descriptions ofobjects. and by objects he means the objects as defined by the language game.
I contend that this formulation of represeDWion is not one that Rorty would contest, for it
is a nonmirroring. nonmetaphysical form of representation that does nothing more than
describe the world as it is seen from within a particular language-game. In other words.,
representation without representations is DOtting like the Icind of representation that Rorty
resists. It is a completely different picture ofrepre:senwion that happens to be quite similar
to the picture that Rorty offers. But, whereas Putnam uses the term 'representation.' Rorty
simply drops this tenn because it sugests the notion of symbols connecting with a language-
independent world. Rorty takes pains to avoid the metaphysically loaded vocabulary of the
tradition and instead chooses words that distance him from the confusion that he associates
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with this vocabu1ary. Putnam is unscttlcd by this distance and therefore he prefers to retain
the traditional terms. Contraty to PutDam's dIim that Rorty overlooks the middle ground of
represmtation without representatiOllS,. this is euctly the position - but not the vocabulary -
that Rortyadopu.
4.22 TlWIH AND R.EI.A.TIVlSM
According to Rotty, pragmatism comes at great philosophical cost, for it means that
there is nothing between us and the world; that is, there is no subject/object split, with
language as the mediwn between subject and object. Consequently, any metaphysical inquiry
or epistemology that attempts to discover the true relationship between us humans and the
world as it is iJHtseIfis unnecessary. Putnam is uncomfortable with this position because he
believes it prematurely discards a substantive notion of truth for an entirely relative notion.
But Rorty is not doing epistemology, and neither" is Putnam in any traditional sense; however,
unlike Rarty, Putnam continues to call his own nontraditional project epistemology.
In his earlier attempt to maJce truth more substantial in Realism With a Human Face,
Putnam does not completely disagree with Rorty's natw'alist description of truth; however,
he does insert a set of conditions into the naturalist scheme through which truth gains what
he calls a more substantive and nonrelative content. These conditions are the ideal ones
contained in truth as idealized rational acceptability. I think Putnam would agree with the
naturalist that our evolutionary success is closely linked to our ability to use language; but,
for Putnam this ability is oot simply a tool whose use is entirely decided by pragmatic
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consensus. According to Putnam tba'c is a history or tradition of language use that has
determined the ways in which we preaeady approach the world with language. He states,
~one cannot discover laws ofnature unlessonebriDgt; to nature a set ofa priori prejudices.dJ
and these prejudices come from the trwfitioo which bu formed the habits of reasoning we
now have.
And, indeed, the history of!CHDce docs DOt support the view that it [the
discovery of the laws of n.dUre] WU all trial aDd error, either- in the sense of
random trial and error or systematic search through all possibilities. Galilee
discovered the Law ofInertia by tbinkiDg about and modifying fourteenth<entury
ideas., which themselves were a modification of Aristotle's ideas.... Einstein was
working in the gencra1 baUpark provided by philosophical specuJations about the
relativity of motion, themselves centuries older than the evidence, when he
produced the special theory of relativity.... There does not seem to be anything
common to all the good theories that scientists succeeded in producing except
this: each was suggested by some Iioe ofthinking that seemed reasonable, at least
to the scientist who came up with the theory.JoI
Thus, according to Putoam, language and the reason which guides its use are not
merely Darwinian survival tools given to us through the evolutionary whims of nature.
Reason, for Putnam, is also a product of our history, and, therefore, sometimes what we
discover is the way things actua1Jy work. Putnam's suggestion is that we ~shift our way of
thinking to the extent of regarding 'the world' as partly constituted by the representing
mind.MJ' In this way, even though the inquiry is guided by our lights, we can sometimes get
it right because the world is at least partly dependent on our conceptual framework.
n Putnam, R~alism WilhaHumanFac~. p. 160.
~ Putnam, /aalism Wilh a Human Face, p. 161.
J' Putnam, Realism Wilh a Human Faa. p. 162.
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But is Putnam's~ of..... ud trUth aetuaDy that different from Rorty's
picture? The 'set of. priori prejudioes' or 'f'eUOO' that Putnam says has devdoped
cumulativdy tbrougbout history &Dd with wbidJ we ID.dt approach the world .sounds very
much like Rorty's et.b.ooc:eDtric positiou tbal we roust dcsaibe the world trow an etltnos Of"
set of etbnoc:cntric prejudices.)I Pu1DIm calls tbae prejudices 'a priori' because they are
necessary fOr us to becapeleofdeIcriIiDg. HDweYer, it is ooIya Jet of prejudices orahnos
that is a priori necessary and not a set ofparticular prejudices. In other words. it is the
general set of prejudices itself - and not the particular prejudices - that is a priori. Putnam's
use of'set ofapriori prejudices' is inconsistent with the remainder of his pragmatism, but this
inconsistency can be avoided i.( instead,. Putnam uses the more ethnocentric 'apriori set of
prejudices.' I contend that the only reasonable interpretation of Putnam's natural realism is
ooe thai: depicts it as a version ofRorty's pragmatism told in a vocabulary that looks like the
VOC8buIary of traditional philosophy but wbieb simply redefines the meanings ofterms such
as 'reaIism', 'tntth', 'objectivity', etc. Putnam's rwuraJ realism is either inconsistent or vague.
and when we supplement it with consi.sleur: explanation we have Rorty's story told in a
reform.dI1ed version of traditional pbilosopbjcal vocabuIaJy where the only sc:rnbIance of the
tradition is the appearance of terms such as 'truth,' 'representation; 'realism,' etc. The
reformulated meanings of these terms are quite different from those of the philosophical
tradition that both Rotty and Putnam criticiu.
:WI See my section 2.5 for a disc:ussion ofRorty's ethnocentrism.
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From Putnam's viewpoint, then, Rorty's distance from the tradition has led him into
relativism. and from Rorty's viewpoint Pub:wn is in the same boat, except it isn't relativism.
What Putnam is caDing relativism here is eaentiaIIy the same u his own natun1 realism which
!Ie claims is not rdativism. My concern bere is that when Putnam is faced with the uncertain
possibilities of Rorty's oonfoundational approacb to philosophy, he slips back into the
comfortable foundationaliJt pictw'e. (This point will receive further explanation in the next
chapter). And this slip is most explicit in his conviction that language does make contact with
the world through a set ofa priori prejudices and that, therefore. truth is a sensible goal of
inquiry.
Putnam charges that by asking us to abandon our commitment to the problem of truth
RoTty is asking us to be relativists and abandon our natural intuitions about the necessity of
uuth and the real world. But 10 interpret Rorty as a relativist is to force him directly into the
b'adition that he bas explicitly abandoned". The usual analytic response to RaTty's refusal to
engage the traditional questions in the traditional manner is to cry "Not fair! How can I argue
ifyou won't speak my language?" From there be is either ignored as a hopeless radical, or
dismissed as a relativist. The relativist, linguistic idealist interpretation ofRorty's pragmatism
is not a charitable one, but it is understandable for those who have trouble with his
nonfoundationalist vocabulary.
n See Rorty's "Solidarity or Objectivity" in his Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, pp.
21-34 for Rorty's response to charges of relativism.
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It seems that the most rcuonablc IDd charitable intctpretation ofRorty is one that
excludes metaphysical or epistemological isIues. That is, when we ask Rorty about the
consequences of his pragmatism m bad better not be preparing to show him how those
consequmoes lead to absurd and puerile re1Itivist philosophies because the absurdities. says
Rorty, are the results of incoherent pbiJosopbicaJ questions. There is no PhilosophiCDl talk
ofobjectivity, truth or reaJism taken seriouIly in Rorty's post-pbilosophical culture.
4.23 REALISM
Must we then abandon our desire to confirm our realist intuitions in Rorty's post-
philosophical euJture? If by confirming realist intuitions we mean providing correct
descriptions of how language hooks onto a language-independent world, then the answer is
~yes. ~ What Rorty wishes us to do is forget such philosophical lines ofthinking that lead us
to pursue the incoherent questions ofmetaphysics and epistemology. But abandoning these
metaphysical ways of thinking does not mean abandoning our most common and naive realist
intuitions about reality. Rather, the real world is the naive and obvious reality or form of life
in which our everyday lives take place.
Putnam finds this position w:ry disturbing, for he believes that philosophiCDl thinking
is a crucial component ofhuman progress and development. Ofmetaphysics Putnam states:
~It has failed not because it was an illegitimate urge-what human pressure could be more
worthy ofrespect: than the pressure to .tnow?-but because it goes beyond the bounds ofany
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notion ofexplanation that we have."JI CooIequentIy, the sensaole course ofaction, according
to Putnam, is to put a moratorium on metapbysical projects. Unlike Rorty's call to abandon
metaphysical projects., the moratorium, says Putnam, is:
the opposite of relativism. Rather than IooIciDs with suspicion on the claim that
some value judgemeats are tcISOrIIbJc IDd some are wueuonable, or some views
are true and some false, or some words refer and some do not, I am concerned
with bringing us back. to precisely tbeIe claims, wbich we do, after aJJ.. constantly
make in our daily 1ives.l9
For Putnam, realizing that our realist irrtuitions are confirmed through the presence of the
obvious reality that we see before us, the reality that we interact with. talk about and, most
importantly, the reality that we live, is a step in the right direction.
Accepting the "manifest image," the Lebenswe//, the world as we actUally
experience it, demands ofus who have. ..been philosophically trained that we both
regain our.sense ofmystery...and our sense ofthe common (for that some ideas
are "unreasonable" is, after an. a common fact-it is only the weird notions of
"objectivity: and "subjectivity" that we have acquired from Ontology and
Epistemology that make us unfit to dwell in the common).4lI
Putnam's recommendation, after 2500 years of failed metaphysics, is not that we abandon
metaphysics for good, but that we try and return to the common and naive ways of thinking
and talking about the world And tJis is precisely what he does with natural realism; he takes
the metaphysics out of realism and offen us realism with a naive and common, human face.
However, is Realism With a Human Face not what Rorty means when he speaks of
Ja Putnam. Realism With a Human Face, p. 118.
19Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. 117.
4lI Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. 118.
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a world without bizarre and incoherem. philosophical imerprewions? I don't think Rony is
asking us to abandon anything more important than Putnam. Both want to stop talking
absolutist metaphysics. but Rorty thinks this iDvotves etu:king the old vocabulary and leaving
philosophy behind. Putnam. however, believes tha1 keeping the old vocabulary and placing
a moratorIwn instead ofa ban on mc:taphysics will salvage philosophy. But how much ofcur
foundalionalist phiIosopbicaI tradition can be saIwged by a temporary return to the naive and
common uses ofour words? As I will argue later in the next cbapter, the
common uses ofour words are cntiJdy nonfoundationa1 and, therefore, Putnam's moratorium
may tum out to be more than just temporary. In fact, it may tum out to be the same as
Rorty's recommendations for change. Rotty's suggestions only appear to be more radical
because he wants to avoid any possb1e confusion by fuDy engaging a new, nonfoundationalist
vocabulary.
Both Putnam and Rotty offer the same diagnosis of metaphysics as incoherent and
failed, and their recommended therapies are similar as well, despite their continued. debates.
The question ofrealism in Rorty's post-philosophical culture is not a philosophical question,
but a naive one whose answer is as obvious as the need not to ask the question. However,
for Putnam, the question of realism can be a pbilosophicaJ one, where 'philosophical' means
the same as 'naive' above. Putnam's natural realism therefore makes the same
recommendation in suggesting that we return to the naive uses of our metaphysically loaded
words as Rorty makes in suggesting that we stop using metaphysically loaded words and try
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4 3 CONCUJSJON
wmJe Putnam's and Rorty's projects are very similar, the two positions differ in one
aspect: they disagree at what appears to be a metaphilosophica1levd. That is, they disagree
about what coune ofaction 10 take after their aiticisms of comemporary philosophy. Rorty
claims tha1 his pragnwism caDs for a c:banse in our ways ofdoing philosophy which abandons
metaphysics and epistemology as fatalfy compromised and pragmatically useless areas of
inquiry. Putnam argues in a manner close 10 Rorty that traditional metaphysics and
epistemology are indeed fatally compromised., but that we can no more abandon these areas
of inquiry than we can abandon our reason. Philosophy, for Putnam, must continue with
metaphysical and epistemological pursuits, but il must be careful to avoid lTaditional pitfalls.
Putnam's difficulty, however, is finding a sensible nonnaturalist account of reason.
Pu1nam claims that his position has positive philosophical content, for, although he
dissolves the factIvalue distinction and denies the correspondence of our beliefs and
slatements to mind-independent objects, he still wishes to maintain a theory of truth and,
therefore, an epistemology. But notice what kind of unique epistemology this is.
Traditionally, truth could only be attn'buted to those beliefs and statements that stand in an
appropriate and accurate relation to mind-independent objects. Putnam, nonuaditionally,
brings truth back inside the human realm of convention and language and maintains a
connection between words and objects in the process. However, the disclaimer is that this
connection cannot be foundational.
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While I am Vtrj sympathetic to Rorty's desire to avoid the confusion associated with
traditional philosophical problems., I am also very supportive ofPutnam's attempts to make
sense of those traditional problems. If it is true that today 'We stand on the edge of a
postmodem. era. but with oae philosopbical foot still very firmly planted in our modem
tradition, then it would seem that the most historically understandable (not necessarily
tenable) philosophical position to take bere would be one that attempts to fuse the modem
tradition with the postmodem tradition-to-be. NatUral realism makes such an attempt.
Some philosophers (Rorty, Foucault. Derrida) have shed their modernism, leaped the
modemlpostmodern chasm and have landed. somewhat shaJcily, on the postrnodem side.
Others have simply refused to make the leap for a variety of reasons. But Hilary Putnam has
carefully anempted to straddle the chasm which has opened up before our tradition. I
therefore see his pragmatism partly as a patient and commendable struggle to make sense of
contemporary metaphilosopbical issues. However, in the nect chapter I suggest that Putnam's
patience may simply be wmecessary stagnation in the comfon of foundationalist philosophy.
Perhaps it is time he completed the move to a truly nonfoundational philosophy and avoided
the certain confusion that an ambiguous position such as his natural realism generates.
Consequently, the next and final chapter will argue that the confused criticism directed at
nonfoundabonalist philosophy by contemporary critics reflects the deep struggle we have in
leaving tnditional foundationalist philosophy behind. Putnam's relativist charge against
Rorty's pragmatism is one clear example that this struggle is deeper than we think for even
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The new pragmatist rec:ommendItioa f« COI'llCmpOI1U'Y pbiIosophy are significant for
they come at the end ofa century that began with serious pbilosopbicaI r~tion. By
exposing the shortcomings of modem foundationalist metaphysics.. Putnam and Ratty are
playing crucial roles in revamping our philosophical approacb. As a deep and final inquiry
into the absolute nature of reality, metaphysics has traditionally held a privileged position
throughout the histOIY ofphiIosophy. Metaphysical realism is the most appropriate example
offoundationalist thinking, and, as I explained in chapter one, it consists of three theses: real
objects exist; real objects exist independently of experience; and we can know these real
objects through a final vocabulary in which our words directly correspond to these objects.
The past fifty years of philosophy raises new concerns about the integrity of these three
presuppositions. Putnam and Rorty recognize the historical relevance of these concerns., and
their recommended changes are worth considering.
In the spirit ofPutnam's and Rorty's criticism ofrnetaphysical realism. r too contend
that if philosophy is to make sense in the next century. then indeed it must first be rid of
incoherent foundationaJjsm. However, in the light of their criticisms presented in chapters
two and three, I see no benefit in repeating the reasons why metaphysics is incoherent. It will
suffice to say that, for the same couvincing reasons Rorty and Putnam offer, I can see no way
to make sense ofmetaphysical realism. However, I do feel it necessary to explain why some
contemporary philosophers still assume that foundar:ionalist: thinking is necessary and why
they proceed to redefine it in spite of its fundamental incoherence. I contend that the time
these philosophers spend redefining confused concepts· like representation, truth and
reference - could be better spent practicing a coherent, nonfoundationaiIst language.
Therefore, this final chapter will first present what I consider to be a likely reason for our
cum:nt reluctance to embrace nonfoundationalism. and then it will suggest a way of getting
beyond it.
The first section of this chapter will show that even though we recognize the
incoherence of metaphysics.. some philosophers still have difficulty overcoming
foundationalism because they inappropriately tie it to our most ordinary beliefs about the
world. I will then disassociate our ordinary talk about the world from foundationalism in
order to show that a nonfoundationalist language, such as the one Rorty employs, 15 both
coherent and relevant to contemporary society.
5 I THE FRUSTRATION Of NONfOtJNDATlONAUSM
5 II JlJSTIF)1NGORDINARVLANGtTAGE
I first read RaTty's Philosophy and The Mirror ofNature about six years ago, and ever
since I've been st.ruggling to come to grips with what I thought was a serious concern with
his new pragmatism: ifthere is no conunon reality (in the traditional, metaphysical sense) [hat
underlies the amy ofdifferent languages that descnoe our world, then what is it that we are
desaibing? and what is language? To put it another way, how does one philosophize about
reality without using a foundationalist language? Both Rorty's persuasive anti-foundatlonalist
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narratives and Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism left me without a coherent
language to justify my ordinary belieftbat C'oU)'ODe OIl our plaoct and beyond shares the same
universe. After Philosophy and the Mirror of NahITe I could no longer make sense of
representationalist epistemology and corrapondenoe theories of truth. and, at times I feel
compelled to abandon theories of repraenwion, truth and reference. But in spite of this
compulsion there are times when Rorty's noafouDdItionalist pngmatism seems to entail
absurd relativist consequences., and I become wary of abandoning traditional methods.
Considering Rony's rocky reception within the North American philosophical tnadition, it is
clear that many others sbare my reservations as well.
I suggest that the reason for much of the current reluctance to embrace
DOnfoundatiOnaiism is not that these philosophers are convinced that foundationalism is
coherent because, as with any metaphilosophical position, there is plenty of room for
skepticism and debate. Rather, I hold that our frustration about Ratty's approach is due to
our philosophical tendency to attach foundational weight to ordinary beliefs such as 'everyone
on our planet and beyond shares the same reality,' beliefs that only appear to be absolute. [
say 'appear' because, as I will show in the later balfofthis chapter, such ordinary beliefs are
more like ethnocentric expressions of the prejudices inherent in a fonn of life. But the
problem I see is that today's metaphysical realists and those of us who snuggle to leave
founda:lionalism are stiIJ gripped by the beliefthat absolute justification is necessary to justify
our ordirwy and intuitive behavior. Thus at times we have diffiCLLIty rejecting
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foundationalism because we fear our most fimdamentaI and natUnl1 attitudes towards our
world must go with it.
I consider philosophy to be a coaIext or justification for our ordinary activities and
inntitive behavior. Rorty seems to take a similar view. As Rony explains it, the attempts of
enlightenment philosophy to separate ICieDcc from theology first resulted in the separation
ofphilosophy from both scicDce aod reigioo.l When DelIcartes inverlled the knowing subject,
says Ratty, he turned philosophy into a theory ofknowledge and thereby distinguished it from
ordinary intellectual activities. Philosophy then emerged as a separate discipline, an
epistemology that provided absolute justificalioo for" ordinary activities in the form oftheories
oftruth. perception, reference, etc.
But the need for absolute justification appeared long before Cartesian dualism turned
philosophy into epistemology. Plato's theory of forms. as it appears in the Republic, is a
complicated metaphysics created to justifY or ground GrecIc culture in absolute cenainry.
Plato thought it necessary to distinguish between appearance and reality, ~ and this
~entIy facilitated the justification ofordinary beliefs in something extraordinary, where
reality is the extraordinary something. Whereas Descartes aimed to ground common beliefs
by finding their cause in an immaterial mentalistic world, Plato grounded common beliefs in
I See Rony, Philosophy and /he Minw ofNatJlre. p. 131.
~ See Plato'sMeno and Ph«do where the theory offonns originate and the dualism of
appearance and reality is fanned.
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an immalerial world ofeternal. unchangjPs forms. Both systems are foundational. and both
assume that our common beliefs and pnctices require absolute justification.
Putnam agrees that most pbilosopben bctieve philosophy acts in the interests ofour
ordinary activities. Ofcontemponry analytic philosophy be writes:
most analytic philosopher{s] nowadays coosidc:r tbemsdves to be providing something
like (or at least -continuous with-)alCicDific CIqlIaDaboD ofthe success ofordinary ways
of thinking and talking.J
In fact, he argues in Realism With a Human Face that we should renew philosophy by
returning to ordinary, naive language. Putnam's solution is quite different from the one that
Descartes and Plalo offer because Putnam. has openly rejected the God's-Eye View that these
philosophers attempt to reach. However, Putnam's reluctance to go 11.I1 the way with Rorty
indica1es that, for him, a nonfoundationatist language is somehow incomplete. I attribute this
hesitation to the belief thaI our ordinary language is foundational.
Putnam's discomfort with a truly nonfoundationalist language is quite evident in
Rea/ism With a Human Face. Here heacaJSCSRorty oftaking philosophy 10 be the pedestal
upon which culture rests and then berates him for thinking philosophy can dictate a change
in our natural intuitions. Putnam writes that for Rony:
The failure of our philosophical -foundations" is a failure of the whole culture, and
accepting that we were wrong in wanting or thinking we could have a foundation requires
us to bephilosophiooJrevisionists. By this I mean that, for Rony or Foucault or Derrida,
J Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, p. 140.
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the failure of foundationalism makes • differeoce to bow we are allowed to talk in
ordirwylife.'
But Putnam misinterprets Rorty. Rorty is puzzled over this philosophical revisionist
accusation and his response is, simply, MI think Putnam is just wrong about what I say. d
Rorty is not asking that we alter- our ordinary activities on philosophy's authority; rather, he
is asking that philosophy change on his cthnocaItric authority.
The pragmatist, dominated by the desire for solidarity, can only be criticized for taking
his own COlIUl1wUty too seriously. He can only be criticized for ethnocentrism, not for
relativism.~
I contend that Putnam's misinterpretation, as weD as his reluctance to go all the way with
Rorty, lies in thinking that embracing II truly nonfoundationallanguage means changing the
ways we explain things in ordinary life. In other words, I think Putnam retains some traces
of foundationalism, for be would not take Rotty's position to be a change in our ordinary
ways of talking if he thought our ordinary ways oftaUcing were nonfoundational.
It is true that Rorty calls for a change in the uses ofour words, but these changes are
recommended only to metaphysical realists and other foundationaIist philosophers who use
words quite differently than we do in everyday language. Since Putnam is calling for a retUrn
to ourconunon uses oftenns suell as 'truth,' it is difficult to see wily he then considers there
to be a philosophical problem with truth. Here we see that Putnam's shaky conviction that
6 Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. 20.
S Rorty, ·Putnam and the Relativst Menace, ~ The Journal ofPhilosophy, 90 (1994), p.
445.
'Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, p. 30.
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language does malce contact with the outside world is causing his natural realism serious
problems because iflanguage can make IXlIUCt wiZb the world, then we need an epistemology
and a theory of truth to explaiD how it does this. But Putnam is unwilling !o accept an
ethnocentric explanation ofhow language is CODDeCt:ed with the world, and we have yet to
see a coherent theory ofhow this coatact is possible in the way Putnam intends it.
S 12 FOUNPATIONALISM AND TIJE RELATMST MENACE
Putnam's repeated characterization ofRorty as a relativist is additional evidence of
Putnam's foundariooalist tendencies. Putnam shows that relativism is inconsistent because it
is the converse of inconsistent foundationalism. He then claims that Rorty's pragmatism is
simply the converse of foundationalism and is therefore relativist. Thus, for Putnam. RoTty's
position is inconsistent because it is -simultaneously a misdescription of the notions we
actually have and a self.refuting attempt to both have and deny an 'absolute perspective.'-'
However. Putnam has previously argued that an absolute perspective is an inconsistent and
untenable View from Nowhere because such perspectives cannot be achieved. Does Putnam
really consider Ratty's pragmatism to be an answer to a senseless question? But why would
he consider Ratty's pragmatism to be an answer to the absolutist question when Rorty has
s:pem. the better part ofhis carcc:r trying to convince philosophers to drop these very kinds of
questions? In the case ofmetaphysical realists on the other side ofthe absolute/relative coin,
7 Putnam, Realism With a Human Face. p. 26.
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Putnam tries to show them that the qUCItion their IDdapbysics is meant to answer is
meaningless and that. tberdOre. their answers are also memiDgless. However, Putnam makes
no attempt to show how Rorty miIuIIdcntaDds the same question because Putnam should be
well aware that Rorty is not intending to answer that question.
In light of Putnam's middle-of-the-road tendaJcy to walk: the line between debates
such as the realismIantirealism debate (what Rorty calls 'pamJox mongering'), as well as his
apparent discomfort with nonfoundationalist language. I believe that Putnam's relativist
charge is an indication that he is slipping back into some kind of foundationalism. Rorty has
a similar complaint about relativist charges in Objectivity, Relanvism and Truth, which was
written before Putnam's latest relativist intCflH'CWiOD ofRorty's pragmatism. Rotty writes:
"The realist is, once again, projecting his own habits ofthought upon the pragmatist when he
charges him with relativism.·· It is worth DOting that implicit in Rorty's use of the phrase.
'habits of thought,' is the Dotion that our metaphysical intuitions are the results of a long
history offoWldationaiist philosophy. His tiustration with continued relativist charges is
agitated by the diffirolty contemporary philosophers have breaking the deep habits generated
by this history.
Why does Putnam unfairly charge Rorty with relativism? I contend that Putnam
accepts the general sense ofRorty's pragmatism but then he slips back into foundationalism
I Putnam, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 30.
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by charging Rorty with rdativism. Putnam specu1Ites that Rorty's pragmatism is a
consequence ofhis disappointed rCICboct to the impossibility ofmetaphysics.
But why is Rorty so bot:hertd by the lack ofagwl1'CI1IUe that our words represent things
outside tbc:mse1ves? EvidaJdy. Rorty's aaviDs fur" such a guarantee is so strong that,
finding the lJIWUltee to be "impouibIe.. be feels forced to conclude that our words do
not reprcsm mytbiog. It is u this poinI: iDllorty's position that one detects the trace of
a disappointed metaphysical realist i:mpuIse.t
PcrlJaps Rony is disappointed. but I don't tbiak: his disappoiutmerrt has made him blind to his
own criticism of metaphysical realism. I will therefore explain why I think Putnam's
characterizJll:ion ofRorty's pragmatism is an indication that Putnam is slipping back into the
foundationaIist picture.
As I have been arguing. foundationalist philosophy has been too closely tied to our
common beIie& about our world. and now we have problems reconciling a nonfoundationalist
language with this philosophy. Putnam's hesitation to break fully with foundationalism is
detectable in his ambiguous natural. realism (that WOJk still in progress) and obvious in his
relativist charges against Rorty. But I contend that it is Putnam's conviction that ordinary
language is in some way foundational that leads to these relativist charges. As [ mentioned,
Putnam cleverly argues that relativism is a View from Nowhere because it inherits the
inconsistency inherent in the absolutist question. He then proceeds to demonstrate the
inconsistencies and absurdities associated with the loss of reference, truth and so on. But
these responses ultimately beg the question for they are phrased in the very foundationaIist
, Putnam, Wordsand Life, p. 299.
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vocabulary that Rotty rejects as 5e111eieu. It is coocepts like truth, reference and even, as
Putnam himsdfsbows,. relativism, that Rorty deems to be incoberent. This is why he argues
that a nonfoundationalist language is the bcttc:r choice. Unless Putnam and relativist critics
can make these concepts cobereat, then Rorty's DOOfouodarioual is in DO danger ofbeing
a relativistic View from Nowhere. Rorty'l etbatoodriIm is as clearly a view from somewhere
as views get. I therefore contend that in the face of Rorty's position Putnam has an
unfortunate tendency to fa.lJ back on some kind offoundationa1ism.
The charge of relativi.sm. in my opinion, is a serious case of a tendency towards
foundationalism, and most ofRorty's aitics see his pragmatism as some form of relativism. 10
Thus, Ilhink many ofRorty's critics extu"bit this tendency. I think this is what's going on.
Ordinarily, we believe that our different descriptions of the world describe the same reality;
but we don't ordinarily question this belief. However, the critics who charge Rorty with
relativism consider that ordinary Ianguagc needs absolute justification, and since
foundationalism tries to justify such common bdiefin the given. its failure means there are
many different realities or that there is no common reality. They ultimately find this
consequence both philosophically and ordinarily inconsistent. But the philosophical
inconsistency lies in the inheR:nt inoonsisI:cncies oftbe foundationalist language in which these
critics phrase their criticism. And since, ordinarily. the question of whether or not our
10 See Jennifer Case, for example. in her article, "Rarty and Putnam: Separate and
Unequal, ~ The ScuthernJoumal ofPhilosophy, 33 (1995) pp. 169~184. Case argues that
relativism is implied in Rorty's ethnocennic pragmatism, but this criticism is a clear case of
the fouodationalist tendencies I am descnbing.
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different descriptions describe the same reality doesn't arise. there are no inconsistencies in
RoTty's nonfouodationalist language.
l.JltimItely, it is the~OD - still bekl by many philosophers. that ordinary ways
of talking about reality need foundatiooa1ist justification that warrants these charges of
re1ativism and encourages tolerance ofan impossible metaphysi<:allanguage. Because oflhis
philosophical assumption. critics who cry 'rdativism' are both philosophically and ordinarily
uneasy about nonfoundationalism. In other words, because RoTty's pragmatism doesn't look
right, they see no point in trying it on. But unless we make an attempt to distance ourseJves
from a metaphysical vocabulary by play;ng with other vocabularies., a nonfoundationalist
philosophy will never begin to make sense. That is, if metaphysical realists and other
foundationalists refuse to jump into the unfamiliar, nonfoundationalist water, they will
continue to recoil from its cold surlilc:e with unwarranted charges of relativism.
An unfortunate resuJt of this discornfoct is that many ofRorty's critics, and others who
struggle with the foundationalist urge., often miss the crucial possibility that maybe our
ordinary bcJiefthat everyone shares the same reality is not an endorsement ofa metaphysical
voeabu1ary. That is, the discomfort that some philosophers suffer, because of the assumption
that a metaphysical vocabulary is necessary to justify ordinary language, inappropriately
dismisses possibilities like Rotty's ethnocentric pragmatism, possibilities that take language,
ordinary and philosophical, to be DOnfOundatiOnai and in no need ofabsolute justification.
In the remainder of this chapter I will explore this underapprcciated poSSlbility and suggest
a way ofovercoming the discomfort we feel u we forget foundationalism. I think this can
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be accomptisbed or at least f.aci:6tated ifpbiloIopbers nltrKt the metaphysical import that they
have mappropriatcly brought to onfuwy~
5 2 FORGETIING FOUNPAIIONAYSM
In this final chapter I have argued that the philosophical reluctance to embrace
nonfoundationalism originates from the pbilosopbical assumption that ordinary language
requires absolute justification. On this assumption foundaIionaIism is invoked by philosopbers
who think it necessary to establish absolute justification for our naive attitudes and ordinary
beliefs about reality. But we have already seen in chapters two and three that a metaphysical
vocabulary, as we cum:ntJy 'understand' it, wiD not achieve the kind ofabsolute certainty that
metaphysical realists covet. We have also seen in those chapters that in a modest
nonfoundationalist language there is no coherent reason to covet such aspirations. In what
remains of this thesis I will contest the foundationalist conviction that ordinary language
requires absolute justification. I contend that once we have a clear ethnocentric picture of
ordinaJy beliefS, beliefS such as 'everyone shares one common reality'. then maybe we will feel
less Icinship with our foundationalist assumptions. The hopeful result is a philosophical
community that is less reluctant to embrace nonfoundationalist language.
My first concern with advocating the use of such language is with the possibility of
slipping back into foundationalism. For example, the question KCouJd ordinary language be
more appropriately described in a nonfoundationaI language?~ often causes problems. That
is. I have found that when others bear me respond to this question with an admittedly
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reluctant ·Yes,· I am immediately asked to provide and justify a nonfoundationalist
description of language. This is my response. The biologists and linguists of my linguistic
community have convinced me (for now) that language is very complex behavior. a useful
extensionofour bodies. T'baI: is, likcalongann, ocbetteryet, a longer club, we use language
to our advantage. Those members of the species who lack linguistic behavior will be at a
disadvantage and may DOt survive nature's selection process. Therefore language allows us
to reach out and touch places that we could not otherwise touch; this is usually - and, in fact,
has been • beneficial. My problem, however. arises when I am asked to justifY this
nonfoundationalist description.
My justification consists of the bits ofevolutionary biology and linguistics that I've
learned, and I usually accompany this justification by adding lhat this naturalist theory of
language is but one story, one among many explanations of language; it just happens that it's
the one that I and people like me find most convincing. However, for many of my
philosophical companions this justification doesn't cut It, and rm asked to justifY my use of
evolutionary biology. But at dis point I simply explain that of aU the theories and stories that
I've heard about our acquisition and use of language, the naturalist theory makes the most
sense to me. I might also spend some time explaining why I think other explanations make
less sense to me. but this response hardly suffices, and my philosophical interlocutor is usually
discontent with my appeal to apreference for a particular explanation. In other words, for
my interloartor, appeals to penonal preference, that is, appeals to what 'makes the most sense
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to me: are insufficient justification. But, if absolute justification is unavailable, then what
more can I say? Is there any sensible reason for further justification?
When I exclaim that the nuuralist view of language 'makes the most sense to me,' I
am providing aU the justification I have available. That is. the statement, 'what makes the
most sense to me,' expresses a very powufuI justification of my belief in the natucal.ist
description of language because it expresses my jonn oflife: it is a way ofcalling up one's
entire belief system and the language in which these beliefs are expressed. To completely
explain 'what makes moce sense to me' would require an exhaustive description of one's entire
web of beliefs. Some explanations make more sense than other explanations, and making
more sense simply means that certain explanations cohere. or 6t better among an earlier.
established set of beliefs. Justification stops here because there is no sense in further
justification; one's web of beliefs must, so to speak, be presupposed.
The kind of justification just described is not unlike Donald Davidson's view that
beliefs can only be justified by other beliefs. Davidson argues that reference (that which
foundationalists hold responsible for fixing the meaning andjustifying the use ofour words)
is not a relation that: can be desaibed fiom. outside the particular language or theory in which
the reference is made. II Thus the foundationalist notion that justification must come from
reference relations that are independent of the language in use is unwarranted. Rorty
summarizes this quite nicely:
Il See Davidson's -The Inscrutability of Reference", Inquiries Inlo Truth and
InteTfJTf!tation. pp. 227-241.
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If'WC have caJS&1 raatiom (ike tb.Id: between tbeopmiDs ofthe dooc and the acquisition
of. belief) holding between the World aDd the Sci( as wdl as rdations ofjustification
("beins • reaoa ror-) iotcmII to the SeIh aetwc:rl. ofbe6efs and desires. we do DOt need
anyfiatbcrrdltions to exp1aiD bow the Sdf(ICU in touch with World. arxI. convenely.ll
The ttndmcy to iDlerprd this armck CD exInliqJUistic reference as an annihilation of
the obvious world that we ordinarily take for graDled enmplifies the confusion caused by
foundldiooalist thinkiDg. This confusioIl is the I'WIIliDa toptbc:r ofour ordinary attempts to
justify our beliefs to those who sbue our wortd aDd the pbilotopbical desire to explain bow
these beliefs are justified on a deeper, more foundational, leveL Such justification, according
to the foundationalist, will explain our ordinary tendency to believe, naively, in one shared
reality, that is,. 10 take the real world for gnmled. But the the explanation of the causes ofour
beliefs goes DO deeper than the causes themselves. -For, although ther-e are causes of the
acquisition ofbeliefs, and reasons fOC" the retention or change ofbeliefs, thtte are no causes
fordle lTvtb ofbeliefs.- IJ The familiar mistake offoundationalists. however, is to conclude
from this lack of an ectraIinguistic explanation that there are no causes whatsoever and
lherefore our axnmon world is lost. But this is an unnecessary reaction. It is companble to
theruc:tion ofthose who charged the I..a1tr Wtttgenslein with espousing a behaviourism that
seemed to empty the notion ofa mental evart ofits real content. Wittgenstein's words of
comfort for these aiucs apply 10 disappoimed foundationalists as well. Wittgenstein writes:
13 ROrty, Objeclivity, Relalivism. and Truth, p. 120.
\, Rorty, Objectivity. Relativism. and Trulh, p. 121.
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It [a mental event} is not a something, but not a nothingeitber! The conclusion was only
that a nothing would serve just as wdI 8$ a something about wlUch nothing could be said.
We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itselfon us here. 14
In the same way that nonfoundationalists do not dispute the presence of what common sense
says is reality, Wrttgenstein does not disput the presence of menta! events.
Thus it is only my more philosoplUcal companions who are unsatisfied with my
ethnocentric justification of a naturalist description of language. In ordinary circumstances
ethnocentric justification is quite sufficient. There will always be room for ordinary debate
about ethnocentric justification, but thtsc debates take place within the ethnos and are usually
about the implications ofthe beliefin question for the coherence ofthe ethnos. For example,
ordinarily, someone may argue that my naturalist view of language excludes imponant
spiritual considerations in life. This ordinary language user therefore challenges me to make
my naturalist belief cohere with my web of belief" or fonn of life. If spiritualism is very
compelling in my form of life, then I am forced either to show how naturalism is compatible
with spiritualism or show why spiritualism makes less sense to me and therefore change my
fonn of life by reweaving the new naturalism into it and the old spiritualism out of it.
Whereas ordinary justification requires one to account for the content and coherence of one's
panicular belief"s, philosophical justification, that is, justification with a tendency towards
foundationalism, requires one to account for ordinary justification as a whole. However, as
I pointed out, ordinary justification ofa particular belief consists of the claim that this belief
IS Wrttgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 102, paragraph 304.
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'makes more sense than other beliefs.' This justification is a way ofbaclcing ODe beliefwith
• c:oberent system ofotber beliefs that coostitute a form of life or ethnos.
Ordinary beliefs, such as 'everyone shares ODe commoo reality: are natural,
ethnocentric expressioosofa form oflife. And formsoflife. because they exhibit the dylwnic
movement of history and human interests, are intenwiocd with the changing web ofbdiefs
that comprise them. Thus, our ethnocerttric expressions exhibit our forms of life and
endeavor to appeal to others with whom we wish to share our form oflif'e. Ultimately, we
need not be foundationalists to assert our most basic. ordinary beliefs. But. as the recent
controversies in contemporary philosophy indicate, it isn't always easy to separate our
philosophical intuitions from ordinary practices. These controversies persist because it is
often difficult to distinguish between the ethnocentric propaganda that we use to persuade
others ofour fann oflife and the tendenlious foundationaIism that philosophers have invented
to transform this propaganda. into Truth. This difficulty delays our engagement with a
nonfoundationalist language and impedes our acceptance of the !leW pragmatist
rccommenda1ioos.
5 3 CONCLUSION
[t seems to me that the mo. contentious issue at this stage in our philosophical
development is the philosophical beliefthat foundationalism is necessary to justifY ordinary
language. I have already explained that this assumption originated out of the Platonic desire
to ground ordinary practices of ancient Greek culture in absolute certainty. Plato, for
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example. understandably saw the need to ground Guek culture in absolute certainty and the
metaphysics explicated in The Republic was a means to achieve such eenainty. Rorty has also
explained that Descartes reaffirmed the foundationalist assumption by placing new
epistemological emphases on the need for absolute justification with respect to knowledge
and truth. Descartes also understandably saw the need to justify belief in God and the
immortality ofthe soul so that the religious. political climate might be more receptive to a
threatening Galilean science.
However. the historical locations ofPlato. Descartes and most philosophers up until
the twentieth century did not permit them fully to appreciate the incoherence inherent in
metaphysical projects, and for this reason I think that the foundationalist assumption is more
understandably held in these past traditions. But I think the past century of increasingly
convincing antifoundationalist argument has thickened the foundationalist air and made it
more difficult to breathe. As these arguments compel re-examination of traditional
assumptions the foundationalist position is becoming clearer. But as foundationalism
becomes clearer it is clear that it is confused. and the confusion is quite deep. The struggle
we currently have rejecting the tradition reflects a philosophical community shifting between
two very different philosophical pictures. We are undoubtedly in transition and the degree
to which we are gripped by the fouodationalist picture will determine the duration of this
transition.
This thesis and particularly the last chapter are meant to help loosen the grip ofour
current foundationalist assumptions. As I've indicated. the incoherence offoundationalism
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has been recognized by many COntCffiporvy philosophers, but there remains a strong tendency
for these same philosophers to lapse into foundationalist criticism of the new
nonfoundarionalist language. I have also shown that this teodency exposes the foundationalist
assumption that ordinary language is a naive way of talking about a reality that is independent
of observers. Allow me 10 summarize briefly my assessment of the problem with this
foundationalist resistance to nonfoundationalism.
Neither Putnam nor any critic ofRorty's nonfoundationalist language offers what I
consider to be legitimate reasons for clinging to foundationalist vocabulary. It is true that
many critics demonstrate the inconsistencies and absurdities associated with the loss of
refCl"eDCe, truth and so on, but these responses ultimately beg the question of foundationalism.
That is, the foundationalist charge of relativism can only apply to theories espoused in a
foundationalist vocabulary because this charge is ultimately a foundationalist concept.
Therefore. relativist criticism employs the very language that Rorty rejects as senseless; and
it does so on the basis thai foundationalism acts in the basic interests of ordinary language.
My intentions have Deen to show that ordinary language neither implies nor implores
foundationalist justification and, therefore., there's no reason, ordinary or philosophical, to
retain foundationalism, especially since it has already been shown to be incoherent. But this
is no worry to those who truly believe that ordinary language is nonfoundational. The
problem is that not many of us are entirely convinced that nonfoundationalism is a safe
alternative. I do think we need to be cautious about our decision to abandon foundationalism,
and this note ofcaution is voiced in Putnam's careful criticism offoundationalist metaphysics.
12.
His replacement. natural realism. may not be the clearest philosophical picture. but perhaps
Its obscurity is hiding something more profound. However. it seems to me that, for now. this
possible profundity is simply unfortunate baclcsl.iding into incoherent foundationalism.
Nevertheless. we need positions like Putnam's to prevent reckless disregard for the
significance ofour tradition. rhave argued that nonfoundationaIism does not erase OUT world
and that the absurdity in thinking that it does is indicative of the absurdities generated by
foundationalism itself. I understand that regardless of the reasons for rejecting
foundationalism. embracing seI1SIble alternatives is still a difficult task that requires substantial
effort; but this does not excuse us from trying. The foundationalist picture has been with us
for a very long time. and forgetting it wiU require a great deal offi'ustration as we practice to
become more at home in a nonfoundationalist language.
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